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Fourth amendment aficionados quite understandably maintain a
close watch upon the work of the United States Supreme Court. For
many years now, each Term of the Court has produced several ex-
tremely important rulings on the meaning and force of the amendment.
These decisions are, of course, of immediate relevance to police, prosecu-
tors, judges, and others involved in the criminal justice process, but their
significance hardly stops there. Every member of the legal profession-
indeed, the public at large-is rightly concerned with how the fourth
amendment is construed by the Court. This is because the scope given
to the protections of the amendment, which occupies "a place second to
none in the Bill of Rights,"' largely determines "the kind of society in
which we live."
'2
The October 1982 Term of the Supreme Court was rather ex-
traordinary in that the Court decided a total of nine search and seizure
cases touching virtually every major doctrinal area of extant fourth
amendment law. On the fundamental question of what constitutes
fourth amendment activity, the Court in Florida v. Royer3 provided a def-
inition of a "seizure" and in Texas v. Brown , 4 United States v. Knotts5 and
United States v. Place6 decided, respectively, that it was no "search" for
the police to look into a car with the aid of a flashlight, to follow a
person with the aid of a transmitter hidden in his effects, or to discover
* David C. Baum Professor of Law and Professor in the Center for Advanced Study,
University of Illinois; S.J.D. 1965, LL.B. 1959, B.S. 1957, University of Wisconsin.
1 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2 E. GRISWOLD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME COURT 39
(1975).
3 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
4 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983).
5 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983).
6 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
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drugs in luggage with a drug detection dog. Regarding the amend-
ment's "probable cause" requirement, the Court in Illinois v. Gates
7
adopted a new approach to probable cause determinations and then uti-
lized it to find probable cause based upon the partially corroborated tip
of an anonymous informant. As for searches or seizures permitted with-
out full probable cause under the so-called balancing test, the Court in
Illinois v. Lafayette" permitted routine inventory within containers in the
possession of an arrestee, in Royer examined what type of seizure of a
person is permissible on a reasonable suspicion, in Place decided that
luggage could be temporarily detained on a reasonable suspicion, in
Michigan v. Long9 ruled that a protective search of a car may be con-
ducted incident to detention of an occupant, and in United States v. Vil-
lamonte-Marquez'O for the first time upheld a brief seizure (there, of a
vessel by customs officers) without requiring either reasonable suspicion
or an established routine. As for the fourth amendment's warrant re-
quirement, Brown and Illiois v. Andreas, I respectively considered when a
container could be seized without a warrant and when one could be
searched without a warrant. The Court did not rule upon any issue
concerning the exclusionary rule itself, though it was in this area that a
bombshell was expected. In Gates the Court ordered reargument on the
specific question of whether a "good-faith" exception to the exclusion-
ary rule should be adopted, but then "with apologies to all" declined to
address that issue.
The purpose of this Article is to present a critical evaluation of
these nine decisions. However, special attention will be given to the four
problem areas which prompted the title's antilogies. These areas, where
the Court's analysis seems particularly vulnerable or troublesome, con-
cern: (i) what constitutes a justifiable expectation of privacy deserving
of fourth amendment protection; (ii) what quantum of evidence should
be required to establish probable cause for a search or seizure; (iii) in
what circumstances and manner the balancing test should be utilized to
permit certain searches or seizures even without probable cause; and (iv)
when a container's contents are sufficiently apparent that permitting a
warrantless search would not jeopardize fourth amendment interests.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT ACTIVITY
In the fourth amendment scheme of things, the precursory issue is
whether any activity governed by that particular constitutional provi-
7 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
8 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983).
9 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
10 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
11 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983).
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sion has occurred. The amendment has to do only with "searches and
seizures," and thus its limitations come into play only if there has been
either a search or a seizure undertaken by or on behalf of governmental
authority.' 2 In most cases whether or not a seizure has occurred is ap-
parent, which may explain why the Supreme Court has had to give rela-
tively little attention to the question of exactly what constitutes a
"seizure" in the fourth amendment sense. The Court has declared that
the seizure of an object "contemplates a forcible dispossession of the
owner,"'13 and that a seizure of a person occurs when an "officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained
the liberty of a citizen."'1 4 Doubtless neither of these definitions is quin-
tessential, but they have proved serviceable in most instances.
By comparison, considerable attention has been given to the ques-
tion of what constitutes a "search" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. At one time the Supreme Court was of the view that what
was required was a physical intrusion into "a constitutionally protected
area,"'15 but that test was abandoned in Katz v. UnitedStates. 16 The Court
there held that the electronic monitoring of a telephone booth used by
Katz was a search because the government "violated the privacy upon
which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth."' 17 Under
this new "privacy" formulation, as Justice Harlan noted in his separate
concurrence, the fourth amendment protects any expectation of privacy
"that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "18
This was unquestionably "a new and more useful approach to the
fourth amendment." 19 As Professor Anthony Amsterdam once put it,
Katz focused upon the ultimate question of "whether, if the particular
form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go unregu-
lated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom
remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent
with the aims of a free and open society. '20 Illustrative of an unques-
tionably correct adherence to that cynosure is one of the cases decided
last Term, Texas v. Brown,21 holding it was not a search for an officer to
12 That is, it acts "as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and. . . not
a limitation upon other than governmental agencies." Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S.
465, 475 (1921).
13 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906).
14 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
15 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961).
16 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17 Id. at 353.
18 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
19 Allen, TheJudicial Quest for PenalJstice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U.
ILL. L.F. 518, 540.
20 Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 403 (1974).
21 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983).
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look through an open door into a lawfully stopped vehicle. There the
officer utilized a flashlight and bent down to get a better look, but the
Court correctly declared those actions "irrelevant to fourth amendment
analysis" because in any event the officer saw only that "which may be
viewed from outside the vehicle by . . inquisitive passersby.
'22
But as a general matter it is fair to say that the Supreme Court has
"failed to pursue the implications of its insight" 23 in Katz and, indeed,
has often taken an exceedingly narrow view of the principle in that case.
Apparently relying upon the fallacious notion that privacy is an all-or-
nothing proposition, the Court has taken the position that there is no
legitimate privacy expectation vis-a-vis the government concerning in-
formation partially exposed in a very limited way to a limited group. A
striking example is a case decided by the Court a few years ago, Smith v.
Maland,24 concluding the petitioner had no justified expectation of pri-
vacy regarding the numbers he dialed on his telephone, obtained by a
police-instigated pen register, because the telephone company's switch-
ing equipment had the capacity to record that information for certain
limited business purposes. The unfortunate consequence of Smith, as
noted by the dissent, is that "unless a person is prepared to forego use of
what for many has become a personal or professional necessity, he can-
not help but accept the risk of surveillance. ' 25 Much the same com-
plaint can be made about the Court's decisions on this subject last
Term, especially the Knotts case.
A. USE OF "BEEPER" NO SEARCH
In Uited States v. Knotts,26 a beeper was placed inside a five-gallon
container of chloroform then sold by a Minneapolis chemical company
to Armstrong, who delivered it in that city to Petschen, who in turn
delivered it to Knotts' cabin nearly 100 miles away in rural Wisconsin.
For a time police kept track of the container by both visual surveillance
and monitoring of the beeper's signals, but during the latter part of the
journey the visual surveillance was ended because of Petschen's evasive
maneuvers, and the signal from the beeper was lost at about the same
time. An hour later the now stationary signal was picked up at the
cabin, for which a search warrant was obtained after three days of inter-
mittent visual surveillance. The Court concluded that this monitoring
was "neither a 'search' nor a 'seizure' within the contemplation of the
fourth amendment" because it did not "invade any legitimate expecta-
22 Id. at 1542.
23 Allen, supra note 19, at 540.
24 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
25 Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983).
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tion of privacy":2 7
A person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to an-
other. When Petschen travelled over the public streets he voluntarily con-
veyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over
particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he
made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from public
roads onto private property.
Admittedly, because of the failure of the visual surveillance, the
beeper enabled the law enforcement officials in this case to ascertain the
ultimate resting place of the chloroform when they would not have been
able to do so had they relied solely on their naked eyes. But scientific
enhancement of this sort raises no constitutional issues which visual sur-
veillance would not also raise. A police car following Petschen at a dis-
tance throughout his journey could have observed him leaving the public
highway and arriving at the cabin owned by respondent, with the drum of
chloroform still in the car.
28
It is this assumed equivalence between mere "visual surveillance"
and "scientific enhancement" in Knotis which is troublesome. 29 Under
the Katz expectation-of-privacy test, the two investigative techniques
simply are not the same. As explained in United States v. Bobisink,30 "the
placement of a signalling device upon one's possessions, to permit the
Government to confirm their whereabouts intermittently, goes far be-
yond any ordinary powers of observation about which citizens are rea-
sonably put on notice." The use of an electronic tracking device permits
a much more extended and thorough surveillance of an individual than
would otherwise be possible. Moreover, especially as this equipment be-
27 Id. at 1087.
28 Id. at 1085, 1087. There was, somewhat surprisingly, no dissent in Knolls. justice Bren-
nan, joined by justice Marshall, concurring in the judgment, added that "this would have
been a much more difficult case if respondent had challenged, not merely certain aspects of
the monitoring of the beeper installed in the chloroform container purchased by respondent's
compatriot, but also its original installation," which he apparently did not question because
he was not the purchaser and thus assumed he was without standing, in that "when the
government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to
obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment even
if the same information could have been obtained by other means." Id. at 1087 (emphasis in
original). justice Blackmun, joined by justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, concurring
in the judgment, objected to the "unnecessary" reliance upon the open fields doctrine. Id. at
1088. justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurring in the judgment,
objected to the broad implication that the fourth amendment does not ever inhibit the police
"from augmenting the sensory facilities bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement
as science and technology afforded them." Id. at 1089.
29 The court in United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 866 n.13 (5th Cir. 1975), afden
bane by equaly divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976), noted: "If this be true. . . then
there is no need for the device in the first place. Its value lies in its ability to convey informa-
tion not otherwise available to the government."
30 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (D. Mass. 1976).
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comes more sophisticated, less expensive, and more readily available,
there is the risk that it will be utilized to carry out a volume of surveil-
lance activity far beyond that which would otherwise be feasible with
available manpower and resources. It is precisely this potential for sur-
veillance of such amplitude which merits the conclusion that the use of
beepers must be subjected to some fourth amendment restraints. 3'
The Court in Knolls asserted that the latter problem could be dealt
with as the need arose: "[I]f such dragnet type law enforcement prac-
tices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be time
enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles
may be applicable. ' '32 But in providing this anodyne the Court did not
suggest by what theory it could later be concluded that the use of a
beeper against one person is not fourth amendment activity but its in-
discriminate use against many is. The Court in Knolls would thus have
been well advised to ponder the wisdom of the teaching in Boyd v. United
States:33 "It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their
first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight devia-
tions from legal modes of procedure."
The Knolls decison is also objectionable because it marks yet an-
other occasion on which the Katz expectation-of-privacy test was dis-
torted and narrowed. In Knolls, it is extremely doubtful that visual
surveillance alone would have revealed the delivery point of the
container-even with monitoring of the beeper, the police lost track of
Petschen for an hour when he began evasive maneuvers after apparently
discovering he was being followed. But this makes no difference, the
Court concluded, because Petschen "voluntarily conveyed to anyone
who wanted to look the fact that he was travelling over particular roads
in a particular direction . . . and the fact of his final destination when
he exited from public roads onto private property. ' 34 But "anyone who
wanted to look" would not have known what the beeper revealed: that
the container purchased at the Minneapolis chemical company was now
at a certain cabin in a secluded area of rural northern Wisconsin. Only
an army of bystanders, conveniently strung out on Petschen's route, who
not only "wanted to look" but also wanted to pass on what they ob-
served to the next in line, would-to use the language in Knolts-"have
31 Just what the restraints should be is another matter. See, e.g., United States v. Moore,
562 F.2d 106 (lst Cir. 1977) (concluding that full probable cause but no search warrant is
needed to monitor a car's movements with a beeper).
32 103 S. Ct. at 1086.
33 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
34 103 S. Ct. at 1085.
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sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the police."35 Just why the disclo-
sure of these fragments to an imaginary line of bystanders must be
treated as a total surrender of one's privacy concerning his peregrina-
tions is never explained in Knotts. The Court has thus continued farther
down the same path as in Smith v. Mayland,36 significantly the prior de-
cision most relied upon in Knolls. By similar analysis, even the facts of
the Katz case itself could be characterized as not involving a search!
37
In concluding that the monitoring was not a search, the Court rea-
soned that while Knotts "had the traditional expectation of privacy
within a dwelling place insofar as the cabin was concerned," "no such
expectation of privacy extended to the visual observation of Petschen's
automobile arriving on his premises after leaving a public highway, nor
to movements of objects such as the drum of chloroform outside the
cabin in the 'open fields.'"38 As for Knotts' claim, accepted by the
court of appeals,39 that there was an intrusion into the sanctity of his
residence, the Court responded this was not so in light of "the limited
use which the government made of the signals."40 Specifically, the rec-
ord did not indicate the signal was received "after it had indicated that
the drum containing the chloroform had ended its automotive journey
at rest on respondent's premises," and thus there was "no indication that
the beeper was used in any way to reveal information as to the move-
ment of the drum within the cabin, or in any way that would not have
35 Id at 1086.
36 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
37 In Katz, FBI agents attached a listening and recording device to the outside of a public
phone booth and in that way heard only the defendant's end of several phone conversations
he initiated there. The Court summarily dismissed the government's emphasis upon "the fact
that the telephone booth from which the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of
glass, so that he was as visible after he entered it as he would have been if he had remained
outside." 389 U.S. at 352. But a Smith-Knou.r type of analysis could well have produced the
result that Katz lacked an expectation of privacy because what he said could have been deter-
mined by a lipreader some distance away or by a hypothetical bystander immediately adja-
cent to the booth.
38 103 S. Ct. at 1085-86. Just what the latter part of this statement is intended to refer to
is far from clear. As Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurring in
the judgment, pointed out, while "the Court implies that the chloroform drum was parading
in 'open fields' outside of the cabin, in a manner tantamount to its public display on the
highways," the "record does not support that implication." id at 1088-89.
39 United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515, 518 (8th Cir. 1981), reo'd, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983).
The court of appeals reasoned that
a principal rationale for allowing warrantless tracking of beepers, particularly beepers in
or on an auto, is that beepers are merely a more effective means of observing what is
already public. But people pass daily from public to private spheres. When police agents
track bugged personal property without first obtaining a warrant, they must do so at the
risk that this enhanced surveillance, intrusive at best, might push fortuitously and unrea-
sonably into the private sphere protected by the Fourth Amendment. It did so in this
case, where the beeper's signal was lost and found again only after the beeper-laden
drum was on private property out of public view.
40 103 S. Ct. at 1087.
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been visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin."'4 1
Because the Court in Knotts deemed it necessary to respond to the
defendant's contention in this particular way, it seems that there are
many possible uses of beepers which do not come within that decision
and consequently are subject to some fourth amendment limitations.
That is, when beeper monitoring discloses activity within premises or
other information not open to observation except with such "scientific
enhancement," then it is not covered by the above Knotts analysis. For
example, if during the earlier part of Petschen's journey, when he
stopped at his own farmhouse, he had driven his vehicle into a garage or
barn where any unloading could not be seen by a lawfully positioned
bystander, so that when the car departed the surveilling officers had to
monitor the beeper in order to determine whether the container was still
in the car, there would have been a search under Knotts. The same
would be true had the unloading at Knotts' cabin occurred in like
circumstances.
This being so, one might think that the Knotts case is deficient in
not elaborating exactly what the unloading circumstances were.42 But
this omission is perfectly understandable. The prosecution could not
tender direct evidence on this point even if it wanted to, since the deliv-
ery occurred at a time and place where there was no visual surveillance,
and the defense apparently saw no need to make those circumstances
known nor any advantage in doing so. In future cases, however, it can
be expected that defendants, as part of their traditional burden of prov-
ing that a search has occurred,43 will attempt to show whenever possible
that the nature of the activity and its circumjacencies were such that
what was established by the beeper monitoring could not have been as-
certained through visual surveillance, even by the Knotts hypothetical
bystander. Upon such proof, it must be concluded that the monitoring
was a search and that consequently its fruits must be suppressed unless
whatever fourth amendment limits apply to this particular activity have
not been exceeded.
B. USE OF DRUG DETECTION DOG NO SEARCH
In United States v. Place,44 a suspected drug courier's luggage was
seized for a period of ninety minutes so that it could be transported to
41 Id
42 The Court asserted, without explanation, that visual surveillance "adjoining Knotts'
premises would have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the police," id at 1086, which seems
to assume that the transfer of the drum from Petschen's car to its location under the barrel
was done in such a way that it could have been seen from neighboring land.
43 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
44 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
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another airport and exposed to a drug detection dog there. The major-
ity held that on the facts presented a dispossession of this length could
not be justified under the Terry v. Ohio4 5 balancing test, but then went on
to say that a shorter dispossession for this purpose would be lawful be-
cause it could not be said that "the investigative procedure is itself a
search requiring probable cause."'46 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court fortunately did not draw an analogy to Knotts or rely upon the
dubious theory of some lower courts that use of a dog is equivalent to an
officer using his own sense of smell or that it simply augments the of-
ficer's sense of smell.47 Rather, the Court placed primary emphasis
upon the unique nature of the investigative technique, which disclosed
only criminality and nothing else:
We have affirmed that a person possesses a privacy interest in the contents
of personal luggage that is protected by the fourth amendment. . . . A
Ccanine sniff" by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does not
require opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that
otherwise would remain hidden from public view, as does, for example, an
officer's rummaging through the contents of the luggage. Thus, the man-
ner in which information is obtained through this investigative technique
is much less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff discloses
only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, de-
spite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the con-
tents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited. This limited
disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to
the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and
more intrusive investigative methods.
In these respects, the canine sniff is sui generic. We are aware of no
other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in
which the information is obtained and in the content of the information
revealed by the procedure. Therefore, we conclude that the particular
course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue here-exposure
of respondent's luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained
canine-did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
48
The three concurring members of the Court quite properly chided
the majority for getting into this issue at all. As they correctly noted,
resolution of the dog sniff issue was not necessary to the decision.
49
45 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
46 103 S. Ct. at 2644.
47 E.g., United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975). Justice Brennan, joined
by Justice Marshall, concurring in the result in P/ace, correctly noted that "a dog does more
than merely allow the police to do more efficiently what they could do using only their own
senses. A dog adds a new and previously unobtainable dimension to human perception." 103
S. Ct. at 2651.
48 103 S. Ct. at 2644-45.
49 This is because once it was decided that the dispossession of the luggage was too long in
any event, there was no need for the Court to address the question of the permissibility of the
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Moreover, the Court's decision on this point can hardly be characterized
as an informed one; as Justice Brennan observed, the matter was not at
issue in the district court, was not reached or discussed by the court of
appeals, and "was not briefed or argued in this Court." 50 Reaching out
in such circumstances is especially unwise when there is more than one
solution which has sufficient merit to deserve careful consideration. As
Justice Blackmun put it, "While the Court has adopted one plausible
analysis of the issue, there are others. For example, a dog sniff may be a
search, but a minimally intrusive one that could be justified in this situ-
ation under Terry upon mere reasonable suspicion." 51
Whether the Place majority's explanation or that suggested by Jus-
tice Blackmun should prevail is, to be sure, a close question. The choice
between the two depends on whether the authorities need to be constitu-
tionally restrained in the use of this investigative device so that it is per-
mitted only where a reasonable suspicion exists (which, incidentally, it
did in Place), or whether the police should be unrestrained and thus free
to utilize this procedure in a wholesale fashion, at random, or on noth-
ing more than a whim or hunch. The argument in support of the Place
approach is that use of this very limited procedure even in these latter
circumstances is unobjectionable because no intrusion upon an innocent
person's privacy interests occurs. On this theory, it is not untoward (to
take the facts revealed in a few recent cases) that the police work these
dogs at random on baggage passing through a certain airport52 or pack-
ages awaiting delivery by a certain freight service.53 In such instances,
no one's possessory interests are interfered with, and the only privacy
interests interfered with are those of the traveller or shipper who is trans-
porting drugs.
One commentator recently suggested that "the fourth amendment
exists to protect the innocent and may normally be invoked by the
guilty only when necessary to protect the innocent," so that "if a device
could be invented that accurately detected weapons and did not disrupt
the normal movement of people, there could be no fourth amendment
objection to its use."'54 But this reasoning, he goes on to note, does not
dog sniffing had the seizure been for a shorter duration. Such was the manner in which the
court of appeals resolved the case. 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981), aJ'd, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
50 103 S. Ct. at 2651 (Brennan, J., concurring).
51 Id at 2653 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
52 State v. Morrow, 128 Ariz. 309, 625 P.2d 898 (1981).
53 State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash. App. 813, 598 P.2d 421 (1979).
54 Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1229,
1246, 1248 (1983); see also Grano, Perplexing Questions About Three Basic Fourth Amendment Issues:




support the "carte blanche use of marijuana-sniffing dogs" 55 such as is
permissible under the Place decision. Those dogs are not indefectible
and thus their use sometimes leads to serious intrusions upon the privacy
of innocent people. The classic example is Doe v. Renfrow,56 where such a
dog "alerted" to a thirteen-year-old girl during a school-wide "sniff" of
all students. This dog continued to "alert" even after she emptied her
pockets, so she was then subjected to a nude search by two women. No
drugs were found, but it was later discovered that she had been playing
that morning with her dog, then in heat. This was not an isolated in-
stance of error. The dogs used in this reconnoiter alerted to some fifty
students, only seventeen of whom were found to be in possession of
drugs. The benefit of the approach suggested by Justice Blackmun,
whereby the sniff would be deemed a minor search permissible only on
reasonable suspicion, is that it would reduce considerably the likelihood
of such unfortunate consequences as occurred in Doe. That is, if the
dogs could not be used wholesale fashion but only against persons and
effects for which an independent reasonable suspicion of drug possession
already existed, then the opportunity for such erroneous alerts would be
substantially reduced.
It may be argued, of course, that this objection is irrelevant to the
matter here under discussion. If these dogs are not as accurate as the
Court assumed in Place, then, it might be reasoned, this bears not so
much on the question of whether the dog's sniffing is itself a search as it
does on the question of whether the dog's "alert" standing alone consti-
tutes probable cause supporting a real search of the effects or person to
which the dog reacted. By thus focusing upon the probable cause issue,
one of two conclusions would be reached: (1) that the "well-trained nar-
cotics detection dog" referred to in Place may sometimes be mistaken (as
in Doe), but nonetheless is sufficiently accurate to provide the degree of
probability of contraband needed 57 under the fourth amendment's
probable cause test; or (2) that because of the possible unreliability some
independent corroboration is needed, meaning not that the wholesale
use of dogs described earlier would be impermissible, but rather that
once the dog alerted to a particular container additional investigation
disclosing other suspicious circumstances would be necessary before a
warrant could issue. While the lower courts58 and a plurality of the
55 Loewy, supra note 54, at 1246.
56 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), af'dinpart, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
57 Courts typically require a higher probability on the question of whether any crime has
occurred. See 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2(e) (1978).
58 See, e.g., United States v. Race, 529 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1976).
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Supreme Court 59 appear to accept the first of these conclusions, it is well
to remember that with rare exception 60 the cases have involved situa-
tions in which the alert occurred after a pre-existing reasonable suspi-
cion. In any event, acceptance of the latter conclusion makes the Place
reasoning more convincing, for whether this problem of reliability is
seen as one of probable cause or fourth amendment intrusion, it is un-
questionable that any risk of error weakens the Court's claim that "only
the presence or absence of narcotics" will be disclosed.
It is extremely important to recognize that the Place holding does
not validate the use of drug detection dogs in all circumstances. The
Court said only "that the particular course of investigation that the
agents intended to pursue here-exposure of respondent's luggage,
which was located in a public place, to a trained canine-did not consti-
tute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. '6 1 For
one thing, this means that if an encounter between a dog and a person
or object is achieved by bringing the dog into an area entitled to fourth
amendment protection, that entry is itself a search subject to constitu-
tional restrictions. 62 For another, it means that if the place is public but
the encounter can be accomplished only by a temporary seizure of the
person or object, then the encounter will again be constitutionally im-
permissible unless there are Terry-Place grounds for such a seizure or it is
otherwise permissible under a Delaware v. Prouse63 standardized proce-
dure approach.64
Moreover, even if there has been no search into a protected area
and no stopping of a person or container, there still may be instances in
which utilization of the dogs is properly subject to fourth amendment
restraints even after Place. In that case, it is well to recall, the Court
addressed only the exposure of luggage to the dog in the suspect's ab-
sence. What then if the agents, anticipating Place's arrival, had simply
been standing by with a drug detection dog and, when Place paused
59 In Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1329 (1983), the plurality stated:
If [a drug detection dog] had been used, Royer and his luggage could have been momen-
tarily detained while this investigative procedure was carried out. Indeed, it may be that
no detention at all would have been necessary. A negative result would have freed Royer
in short order; a positive result would have resulted in his justifiable arrest on probable
cause.
60 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 52 and 53.
61 103 S. Ct. at 2644-45.
62 People v. Williams, 51 Cal. App. 3d 346, 124 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1975).
63 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
64 But see United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1336 (9th Cir. 1982)
([i]t goes without saying that the alternative to random checkpoint stops cited in Dela-
ware v. Prouse, i.e., '[q]uestioning... incoming traffic at roadblock-type stops,'. . . is
totally unpalatable in the canine sniffing context. Nothing would invoke the specter of a
totalitarian police state as much as the indiscriminate blanket use of trained dogs at
roadblocks, airports, and train stations.).
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momentarily in the corridor, confronted him with the dog who reacted
positively? Or what if, as in Doe, the tactic is exposure of the dog to
people only, rather than containers (as in Place) or people carrying con-
tainers (as in the hypothetical just put)? Such practices are not covered
by the Place holding6 5 or by the many lower court cases allowing the use
of dogs for "the sniffing of inanimate and unattended objects rather
than persons"66 and might well require a different result. Certainly "the
very act of being subjected to a body sniff by a German Shepherd may
be offensive at best or harrowing at worst" even "to the innocent snif-
fee," 6 7 and a sniff directed at objects being carried by the person is no
less objectionable, especially when done in an airport corridor in cir-
cumstances amounting to a public accusation of crime.
Perhaps these investigative activities do not involve an intrusion
into privacy or possession or freedom of movement, the interests tradi-
tionally protected by the fourth amendment. But such cases as Place and
Te ry suggest that there are other interests also deserving such protec-
tion. In Place, allowing the use of dogs on luggage not then in the sus-
pect's possession, the Court emphasized that the practice lacked the
"embarrassment . . .entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive
investigative methods."68 And in Terry the Court stressed that the
fourth amendment imposes upon courts the "responsibility to guard
against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing. '69 The kind
of confrontation under discussion here-which, again, was not present
in Place-is embarrassing, overbearing, and potentially harassing, and
thus should be subject to fourth amendment restraints.
C. NONSEIZURE POLICE-CITIZEN ENCOUNTERS
Because, as the Court observed in Terry v. Ohio,70 "encounters be-
tween citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity," it is
apparent that not every such convergence constitutes a fourth amend-
ment seizure. But just what it takes to make an encounter a seizure was
not addressed in Teny or in several of the Court's subsequent cases.
7 1
65 Shortly after Place was decided, the Court refused to hear an appeal by a Texas school
district from the ruling in Horton v. Goose Creek School District, 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.
1982), that use of specially trained dogs to sniffstudents in class was a search. 103 S. Ct. 3536
(1983).
66 Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1026 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
67 Loewy, supra note 54, at 1246-47.
68 103 S. Ct. at 2644.
69 392 U.S. at 15.
70 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
71 In Tery, the Court had no occasion to determine the precise point at which the defend-
ant was seized, as no evidence was obtained prior to the frisk and nothing happened after the
commencement of the encounter which was relied upon to justify the frisk. The companion
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Then came United States v. Mendenhall,72 where Justice Stewart's opinion
announcing the judgment of the Court declared:
We conclude that a person has been "seized" within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave. Examples of circumstances that might indicate a
seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an of-
ficer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's re-
quest might be compelled. . . . In the absence of some such evidence,
otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the po-
lice cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person.
73
The Court in Mendenhall was split in such a way that it cannot be said
with confidence that this position was shared by a majority of the
Court.7 4 Quite significant, therefore, is the decision last Term in Florida
v. 1%oer,75 also involving a confrontation with a suspected drug courier
at an airport, where the Stewart standard was unconspicuously em-
braced by a now-Stewartless Court.7
6
One virtue of this standard is that it is an objective one focusing
upon what "a reasonable person would have believed." What the partic-
ular suspect actually thought is thus not determinative, 77 just as the of-
ficer's intentions are not controlling. This is as it should be. Were it
otherwise, the matter would
be decided by swearing contests in which officers would regularly maintain
case of Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), is equally unrevealing, as is Adams v. Wil-
liams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), which involved a suspect in a parked car who rolled down his
window in response to a police request.
72 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
73 Id at 554-55 (footnote omitted).
74 Only Justice Rehnquist joined the Stewart opinion. Three concurring Justices, Justice
Powell, Chief Justice Burger, and Justice Blackmun, desiring to avoid an issue not considered
by the courts below, instead held that there were grounds for a Teny stop, and thus did not
have occasion to decide either the correctness of Justice Stewart's seizure standard or its appli-
cation in the instant case. As for the four Mendenhall dissenters, Justices White, Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens, they did not question the Stewart standard, but did point out that he
overlooked "certain objective factors that would tend to support a 'seizure' finding," id. at
570, and that because the seizure issue was not raised below the record was inconclusive as to
the factors mentioned by Justice Stewart.
75 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
76 The four-Justice plurality, consisting of Justices White, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens,
endorsed that standard, as did Justice Blackmun in his dissent. No member of the Court
expressly rejected it.
77 If the suspect was guilty, this might bear upon what he would reasonably believe.
Some courts have dealt with this by saying that the question is "what a reasonable man,
innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the defendant's shoes." United
States v. Wilie, 569 F.2d 62, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting Coates v. United States, 413 F.2d
371, 373 (1969)).
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their lack of intention to assert power over a suspect save when the circum-
stances would make such a claim absurd, and defendants would assert with
equal regularity that they considered themselves to be significantly de-
prived of their liberty the minute officers began to inquire of them.
78
But what does it mean to say that a reasonable person "would have
believed that he was not free to leave"? It has been noted that when a
police officer puts a question to a pedestrian there "is a show of author-
ity to which the average person encountered will feel obliged to stop and
respond. Few will feel that they can walk away or refuse to answer."
'79
This, it seems, is an accurate characterization of the great majority of
situations in which an officer approaches a pedestrian and seeks an ex-
planation for his activities or even his identification, which might be
taken to mean that under the Mendenhall-Royer test virtually all police-
citizen encounters amount to fourth amendment seizures.
However, this does not appear to be the meaning of the rule the
Court has now adopted.8 0 A close reading of the language quoted
above, together with consideration of the views expressed in Royer on
this point,8 1 all suggest otherwise. The Court appears to have accepted
the proposition "that the moral and instinctive pressures to cooperate
are in general sound and may be relied on by the police."'8 2 This means
that under the Court's approach a street encounter would not amount
to a fourth amendment seizure merely because of those pressures, that is,
merely because one party to the encounter is known by the other to be a
police officer. Rather, the confrontation would amount to a seizure only
if the officer added to those inherent pressures by engaging in conduct
78 United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1969).
79 Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 398 F. Supp. 882, 899 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
80 See Kamisar, The Fourth Amendment, in J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE
SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1979-1980, 119, 132-43 (1981).
81 The plurality opinion asserts that
law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching
an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to
answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by
offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such ques-
tions .... Nor would the fact that the officer identifies himself as a police officer, with-
out more, convert the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of objective
justification.
103 S. Ct. at 1324. The four dissenters also appear to accept the conclusion that the initial
encounter and questioning did not amount to a seizure. Justice Blackmun said only that a
seizure occurred "at some point in this encounter," id. at 1333, while the other three dissent-
ers, Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor and Chief Justice Burger, did not state when they
believed the seizure commenced but did assert that "when the detectives first approached and
questioned Royer, no seizure occurred." Id at 1337 n.3. Only Justice Brennan (though ap-
parently using the same test, he declared it was "wrong to suggest that a traveller feels free to
walk away" in the circumstances described, id. at 1331) concluded that a seizure occurred
"once an officer has identified himself and asked a traveller for identification and his airplane
ticket." Id
82 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 258 (1975).
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significantly beyond that accepted in social intercourse. So interpreted,
the Court's rule not only matches the actual results in most lower court
cases but also strikes a fair balance. Police remain free to seek coopera-
tion from citizens on the street without being called upon to articulate a
certain level of suspicion in justification if a particular encounter proves
fruitful, yet the public is protected from any coercion other than that
which is inherent in a police-citizen encounter.
II. PROBABLE CAUSE
The Warrant Clause of the fourth amendment declares that "no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause," which means that a
valid arrest warrant or a valid search warrant may issue only upon a
showing to the issuing authority that there is probable cause for the ar-
rest or search. Though a literal reading of the fourth amendment does
not compel such a conclusion, the prohibition upon "unreasonable"
searches and seizures in the other clause is construed to mean that those
searches and seizures which may be conducted without a warrant also
require probable cause. As explained in Wong Sun v. United States,83 "the
requirements of reliability and particularity of the information on which
an officer may act. . . surely cannot be less stringent [when an arrest is
made without a warrant] than where an arrest warrant is obtained.
Otherwise, a principal incentive now existing for the procurement of
arrest warrants would be destroyed." The meaning of probable cause is
thus another extremely important fourth amendment issue.
The Supreme Court has frequently addressed this question, most
often in cases involving information offered by informants from the
criminal milieu rather than by ordinary citizens. With respect to such
situations, a "two pronged test" was developed in Aguilar v. Texas8 4 and
elaborated in Spinelli v. United States :85 there had to be a showing in
some way (not just a conclusory assertion) of both (i) the informant's
veracity and (ii) the basis of his knowledge. Under this approach, the
first prong could be established by showing the informant's past credi-
bility (i£e., that he had supplied reliable information on a past occa-
sion),86 or by showing the information was reliable on this occasion (ie.,
that the information given amounted to an admission against the in-
formant's penal interest).87 The second prong could be directly estab-
lished by disclosure of exactly how the informant came by his
83 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963).
84 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
85 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
86 See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
87 See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1971).
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information,"" or the basis could sometimes be inferred from the great
detail provided.8 9 In addition, the Court recognized that partial corrob-
oration of the informant's tale was important, though the precise rele-
vance of the corroboration to each of the prongs was a matter of some
uncertainty. 90
A. ABANDONMENT OF THE "TWO PRONGED TEST"
The structure just described was at least partially dismantled by the
Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates.9' There, police in the Chicago suburb
of Bloomingdale received on May 3 an anonymous letter stating that a
named couple "make their living on selling drugs" and had over
$100,000 worth of drugs in their basement, "that most of their buys are
done in Florida," that the modus operandi of the couple was for the wife
to drive their car to Florida and leave it for loading and then fly back,
after which the husband would fly down and drive the car back, and
that such a procedure was about to be followed again, which would
result in "over $100,000 in drugs" being brought back in the trunk of
the car.92 The police confirmed that the husband had a reservation to
fly to West Palm Beach on May 5, and surveillance established that he
made the flight, took a cab to a motel, entered a room registered in his
wife's name, and the next morning departed in the family car with her,
driving north on an interstate highway used by travelers to Chicago. A
search warrant for their car and house was issued upon an affidavit re-
citing the above facts and was successfully executed, but the trial court,
appellate court, and state supreme court all held that the affidavit was
insufficient under the two-pronged test of Aguilar-Spinell'. Eschewing the
question it had previously raised concerning the possible admissibility of
the evidence if the warrant was issued without probable cause but in
good faith,93 the Supreme Coiirt instead decided that the above allega-
tions did add up to probable cause.
While some of the Justices worked out an answer to the probable
cause issue one way or another under the existing Aguilar-Spinelli
formula,94 the majority took a more radical step by deciding
88 See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 423 (1969) (White, J., concurring).
89 See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 414 (1969).
90 For discussion of the cases, consult 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 57, at § 3.3(0.
91 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
92 Id at 2325.
93 See infra text accompanying note 147.
94 While Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Powell, and Chief Justice Burger joined the ma-
jority opinion of Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, concurring, after explaining in some detail
why he would use Gates as a vehicle to recognize a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule, see infra note 148, concluded probable cause existed under theAguilar formula, which he
would retain. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissenting, objected to "the
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to abandon the "two-pronged test" established by our decisions in Aguilar
and Spinelli. In its place we reaffirm the totality of the circumstances anal-
ysis that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations ...
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-
sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit
before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial
basis for. . . conclud[ing]" that probable cause existed. . . . We are con-
vinced that this flexible, easily applied standard will better achieve the
accommodation of public and private interests that the Fourth Amemd-
ment requires than does the approach that has developed from Aguilar
and Spineli.
9 5
The rationale behind this abandonment of the approach that had
been utilized by the Court for the preceding fourteen years is set out in
Part III of the majority opinion and consists of the following proposi-
tions: (i) that the "totality of the circumstances approach is far more
consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause" as a " 'practical,
nontechnical conception,'" "a fluid concept . . . not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules"; 96 (ii) that the new ap-
proach is justified by the fact that affidavits "'are normally drafted by
nonlawyers' " and warrants are issued "by persons who are neither law-
yers nor judges, and who certainly do not remain abreast of each judi-
cial refinement of the nature of 'probable cause' -;97 (iii) "that after-the-
fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take
the form of de novo review"; 98 (iv) that if affidavits are subjected to
greater scrutiny "police might well resort to warrantless searches, with
the hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the warrant
clause that might develop at the time of the search"; 99 (v) that the stric-
tures of the two-pronged test "cannot avoid seriously impeding the task
of law enforcement," as under that test anonymous tips would be of
greatly diminished value in police work";100 and (vi) that the two ele-
ments of the Aguilar-Spinelli test should not have "such independent sta-
tus," so that "a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in
Court's unjustified and ill-advised rejection of the two-prong test for evaluating the validity of
a warrant based on hearsay," 103 S. Ct. at 2351, under which they concluded the warrant in
the instant case was invalid. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan, dissenting, con-
cluded the warrant was invalid even under the Court's new "totality of the circumstances"
test. Id. at 2360-62.
95 Id at 2332 (footnote omitted).
96 Id at 2328.
97 Id. at 2330.





determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the
other, or by some other indicia of reliability."' 0' 1
It does not take a misoneist to question the Gates holding, for these
reasons neither individually nor collectively support the Court's result.
As for proposition (i), it is largely a red herring. No one could seriously
contend that the Aguilar-Spinelli formula reduced probable cause to "a
neat set of legal rules" or was likely to do so. Rather, the two-pronged
test simply provided a structure for probable cause inquiries, and, if not
rigidly applied,10 2 allowed sufficient room for assessment of the unique
facts of the particular case. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent,
[n]either the standards nor their effects are inconsistent with a "practical,
nontechnical" conception of probable cause. Once a magistrate has deter-
mined that he has information before him that he can reasonably say has
been obtained in a reliable way by a credible person, he has ample room to
use his common sense and to apply a practical, nontechnical conception of
probable cause. 1
0 3
Proposition (ii) of the Gates majority, that the Court's change in the
probable cause standard is necessitated by the fact that affidavits are
prepared by nonlawyer-policemen and warrants sometimes issued by
"persons who are neither lawyers nor judges," is totally unpersuasive. If
anything, that fact cuts in exactly the opposite direction. As Justice
White wisely pointed out in Gates, that laymen police and magistrates
must often make the critical probable cause determination in the first
instance is all the more reason for the Court "to provide more precise
guidance" rather than "totally abdicating [its] responsibility in this
area."' 0 4 The now abandoned Aguilar formula provided direction and
thus afforded some assurance of rational decisionmaking. The Aguilar-
Spinelli standards, as Justice Brennan put it in his dissent, "help to struc-
ture probable cause inquiries and, properly interpreted, may actually
help a nonlawyer magistrate in making a probable cause determina-
tion."'1 5 The Court's prior cases, by stressing the independent impor-
tance of both the veracity and the basis of knowledge inquiries and by
identifying various ways in which each requirement could be met, pro-
101 Id at 2329.
102 In a footnote, the Gates majority made reference to the fact that three "lower court
decisions, brought to our attention by the State, reflect a rigid application of such rules." Id.
at 2330 n.9. But Justice White quite correctly pointed out in his separate opinion: "The
holdings in these cases could easily be disapproved without reliance on a 'totality of the cir-
cumstances' analysis." Id at 2350 n.26. Moreover, the fact that a few opinions can be found
applying the Aguilar-Spinrlli formula too strictly is hardly a reason for rejecting it in favor of a
less demanding one, especially since there are also opinions applying the old standard too
loosely. See I W. LAFAVE, supra note 57, at § 3.3.
103 103 S. Ct. at 2357-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104 Id at 2351 (White, J., concurring).
105 Id at 2358 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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vided a most useful framework within which both police and magis-
trates could meaningfully operate. By comparison, the Gates approach,
consisting largely of an exhortation to use common sense, does not afford
guidance to police and magistrates. It thus enhances the risk that prob-
able cause determinations will be grounded more upon the predilictions
of the decisionmaker and less upon established rules of law, as the Court
appears to admit.
10 6
As for proposition (iii), "that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the
sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review,"
this truism provides no support for the Court's abandonment of the two-
pronged test. In both Aguilar1 0 7 and Spinelli10 8 the Supreme Court was
careful to reaffirm the principle that a magistrate's determination of
probable cause is entitled to considerable deference. Abandoning the
structure provided by those cases and telling magistrates that under the
new common-sense rule they "remain perfectly free to exact such assur-
ances as they deem necessary"'1 9 discourages not only de novo review but
any meaningful review whatsoever.
Proposition (iv) of the Gates majority, the in terrorem that closer scru-
tiny of affidavits than Gates requires might prompt police to "resort to
warrantless searches," is equally unpersuasive. As the Court noted, it
has long expressed a preference for the warrant process and in that con-
nection has even said that on the matter of "when an affidavit demon-
strates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or
marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the prefer-
ence to be accorded to warrants."' 1 0 This being so, there is nothing to
be gained by police acting without rather than with a warrant in any
106 The Court stated at one point:
Nothing in our opinion in any way lessens the authority of the magistrate to draw such
reasonable inferences as he will from the material supplied to him by applicants for a
warrant; indeed, he is freer than under the regime of Aguilar and Spinelli to draw such
inferences, or to refuse to draw them if he is so minded.
Id at 2333.
107 Where it was acknowledged that reviewing courts "will pay substantial deference to
judicial determinations of probable cause." 378 U.S. at 111.
108 Where it was also noted that magistrates' determinations of probable cause "should be
paid great deference by reviewing courts." 393 U.S. at 419.
109 103 S. Ct. at 2333.
110 103 S. Ct. at 2331 n.9 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965)).
Just how broad this "doubtful or marginal" range is at the periphery of probable cause is
hard to say. When a court rules that evidence obtained in a warrantless search must be
suppressed because probable cause was lacking, it is most unlikely that the court's analysis
will extend to the unnecessary additional step of declaring that the result would have been
otherwise had the police gotten a warrant. Likewise, when a court holds that a certain war-
rant was issued on probable cause, there is no reason to expect that the court will go on to say
that a different result would have been reached on the probable cause issue had the police
foregone the warrant process. But especially if a court in the course of ruling on a probable
cause issue makes some reference to the Ventresca principle, there may well exist considerable
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case in which either alternative is permissible only upon probable cause
and where the officer has some doubts about the sufficiency of the infor-
mation at hand. In circumstances where the law permits the contem-
plated action only with a warrant, proceeding without one would make
even less sense; it would, as Justice Brennan put it in his dissent, "be not
only inadvisable, but also unavailing." '' As for the implication in Gates
that whenever the police might take either the consent search route or
the search warrant route it is important to keep the barrier to the latter
fairly low because the warrant alternative is the preferable of the two,
suffice it to note that the Court's sense of priorities has previously been
expressed somewhat differently.
1 2
Then there is proposition (v), that the two-pronged test "cannot
avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforcement," especially be-
cause anonymous tips "would be of greatly diminished value in police
work." Even assuming the correctness of the Gates majority's assertion
that such tips "frequently contribute to the solution of otherwise 'perfect
doubt as to whether the decision in that case has precedential value in a later case which is on
all fours but for the presence or absence of a warrant.
The point is illustrated by Gates, where the Court abandoned the two-pronged test and
then held that the warrant for the couple's home and car was issued on probable cause. Does
this mean that if the police had instead immediately stopped the Gates' vehicle when it
headed north and had subjected it to a warrantless search under the Carroll-Chambers "auto-
mobile exception" doctrine the outcome would have been the same? Given the prior use of
the two-pronged test by courts in both with-warrant and without-warrant cases, must its
abandonment in Gates be read as its rejection in both contexts? Even if the answer to that is
yes, under the Court's new "common-sense decision" approach will this same limited corrobo-
ration suffice for a warrantless search?
The answers are not readily apparent from the Gates decision. The Ventresca principle is
set out in a footnote, for whatever that is worth. Somewhat stronger ammunition for the
contention that Gates should be limited to the with-warrant context is that some of the six
reasons given for rejecting Aguilar-Spinelli (the need not to discourage police from seeking
warrants, and the need not to subject affidavits to unduly severe after-the-fact review) are
applicable only in warrant cases. But the other reasons discussed in the preceding and follow-
ing text, assuming their validity, have equal force in the without-warrant setting as well.
Because that is so and because of the general disinclination of courts to utilize the Ventresca
principle on behalf of defendants in no-warrant situations, the chances are that Gates will
receive unquestioned acceptance as a probable cause benchmark even when the police have
acted without a warrant. If this is so, the concerns expressed herein about the "watering-
down" of the probable cause test by Gates take on even greater significance.
111 103 S. Ct. at 2359 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112 In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), the Court had high praise for con-
sent searches, which were characterized as a "wholly legitimate aspect of effective police ac-
tivity." Id at 228. For one thing, said the Court, when the police lack probable cause for a
warrant they "may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence." Id at
227. But of special significance here is the Court's additional comment that even when the
police could have instead gotten a search warrant, a search by consent may be preferable
because it "may result in considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the search." Id at
228.
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crimes,' "113 the Court is in error in declaring that the Aguilar-SZiZelli
standard "leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen infor-
mants. "114 It is not a matter of no place or a place, but rather of exactly
what that place should be. Certainly, as Justice Brennan pointed out,
there "is no basis for treating anonymous informants as presumptively
reliable" nor "for assuming that the information provided by an anony-
mous informant has been obtained in a reliable way."'1 15 But an anony-
mous tip can prompt a police investigation by which the necessary facts
could be developed, as the Gates case itself illustrates. The letter con-
fronted the police with the prospect of uncovering $200,000 worth of
drugs, and thus certainly justified some expenditure of police resources
in checking it out. By abandoning the Aguilar-Spinelli formulation, the
Gates majority found that the checking done was sufficient even though
(as Justice Stevens noted in his dissent) what was found was "nothing
except ordinary innocent activity." But if the police had heeded the
letter writer's promise that "if you watch them carefully you will make a
big catch," other facts would doubtless have come to light adding up to
the pre-Gates quantum of probable cause.1 16 That is the proper place of
anonymous informants in the probable cause equation.
But it is proposition (vi) which makes it apparent that Gates in-
volves much more than an adiaphorous change in terminology. That
proposition, again, is that the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge"
prongs of Aguilar should not have "independent status," so that a defi-
ciency in one may be overcome by a strong showing of the other. Sev-
eral examples are offered by the Gates majority in support of this
proposition, the first being that if
a particular informant is known for the unusual reliability of his predic-
tions of certain types of criminal activities in a locality, his failure, in a
particular case, to thoroughly set forth the basis of his knowledge surely
should not serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause based on
his tip.
117
But this simply is not so. The assertion is not supported by the case
cited by the Court in support. 118 Moreover, as Justice White stated in
113 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
114 Id
115 Id at 2356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116 See infra text accompanying note 145.
117 103 S. Ct. at 2329.
118 That case is United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973), which certainly does
not justify any general assumption that an informant's "track record" tends to establish his
basis of knowledge. For one thing, Sellers is a highly unusual case, for the affidavit said the
information "was supplied by an informant who has given reliable information in more than
one hundred instances in matters of investigation." Id. at 40 n.1. An informant, as that term
is used herein, see infra note 127, is unlikely to have such credentials. (Indeed, though this fact
was unknown by the issuing magistrate, the court of appeals in Sellers may have been influ-
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his concurrence regarding that comment by the majority,
[i]f this is so, then it must follow aforiorari that "the affidavit of an officer,
known by the magistrate to be honest and experienced, stating that [con-
traband] is located in a certain building" must be acceptable. . . . It
would be "quixotic" if a similar statement from an honest informant, but
not one from an honest officer, could furnish probable cause. . . .But we
have repeatedly held that the unsupported assertion or belief of an officer
does not satisfy the probable cause requirement.1 19
The second example offered in support of proposition (vi) is that "if
an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of crimi-
nal activity-which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liabil-
ity-we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge
unnecessary."' 120 In support, the Court cited Adams v. Williams.121 But
Adas, apart from being woefully short on analysis,1 22 is not a case in
which the Court was dealing with the meaning of probable cause to
make a full arrest or search. Rather, at issue there was the question of
whether the information received from an informant amounted to rea-
sonable suspicion justifying a stop-and-frisk. Had the Gates majority
instead examined the Court's prior decisions on probable cause, it would
have discovered a principle under the two-pronged formula quite differ-
ent from the example tendered: that an admission against penal interest
is one way to establish veracity.
23
The last example given in connection with proposition (vi) is that
"even if we entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his ex-
plicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a state-
ment that the event was observed first-hand, entitles his tip to greater
weight than might otherwise be the case."' 124 Quite understandably, no
authority was cited to support this bizarre notion. In fact, a detailed
description sheds no light on veracity. "If the informant were con-
cocting a story out of the whole cloth, he could fabricate in fine detail as
enced by the hindsight knowledge that the so-called informant in that case turned out to be a
Special Agent of the FBI.) For another, Sellers is most readily explainable as a case in which
the basis of knowledge was supplied by self-verifying details. The court there held that be-
cause the affidavit contained "detailed statements relating to the organizational procedures of
the gambling operation," this "provided a basis from which a detached judicial officer could
reasonably infer that the informer must have had specific and direct knowledge of this partic-
ular bookmaking operation." Id at 41.
119 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring) (citing Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560
(197 1), Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), and Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S.
41(1933)).
120 103 S. Ct. at 2329.
121 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
122 See 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.3(e) (1978).
123 United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1971).
124 103 S. Ct. at 2329-30.
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easily as with rough brush strokes." 12 5 Likewise, a claim of first-hand
observation is irrelevant to the question of veracity except as it may
make the informant's statement an admission against penal interest.
126
As is highlighted by these deficiencies in the Court's examples, the
Gates majority's proposition (vi) contains a fatal flaw. A "common-sense
decision" on probable cause, to take their language, necessitates atten-
tion to both veracity and basis of knowledge, and to treat a strong show-
ing of one as curing a deficiency in the other makes a mockery of the
fourth amendment's probable cause requirement. The preferred
method of satisfying the basis of knowledge requirement, a direct state-
ment from the informant as to how he came by the information, is virtu-
ally worthless when it comes from an individual from the criminal
milieu 127 about whom no veracity judgment is possible. And informa-
tion tendered by a person of unquestioned credibility is worth very little
when no judgment is possible as to the basis of his conclusions-whether
or not, to use the Court's oft-quoted phrase, he is merely reporting "an
offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar."'128 This is why, as Justice
White quite correctly declared in his separate opinion in Gates, the prob-
able cause standard necessitates "some showing of facts from which an
inference may be drawn that the informant is credible and that his in-
formation was obtained in a reliable way."'
129
It remains to be seen just what the impact of Gates' abandonment of
the Aguilar-Spinelli approach will be and, especially, whether it will re-
sult in a significant "watering-down" of the probable cause standard as
it had developed under the two-pronged formula. As indicated in the
preceding discussion, there is legitimate reason for concern. In speaking
to "the limits beyond which a magistrate may not venture in issuing a
warrant," the Court put only the most extreme case: "the 'bare bones'
affidavits presented in cases such as Nathanson and Aguilar,"1 30 that is,
affidavits which are totally conclusory on both the veracity and basis of
knowledge factors. If trial courts take this to mean that in any situation
short of that they are free to make a "common-sense decision" that
probable cause exists, and appellate courts conclude that in such cir-
cumstances they may not substitute their own common sense for the
125 Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 508, 533, 313 A.2d 847, 862 (1974).
126 See 1 W. LAFAE, supra note 57, at § 3.3(d).
127 Which, absent any facts about the identity of the letter writer, he must be presumed to
be. Of course, when the person providing the information is an ordinary citizen, then usually
there is a presumption of reliability and the focus is upon the basis and completeness of
knowledge. Id at § 3.4.
128 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417 (1969).
129 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring).
130 Id at 2332-33.
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presumed perspicacity of those on the firing line, then Gates will have
produced a great mischief.
Certainly the potential for highly inconsistent and largely unre-
viewable probable cause determinations is there. When the majority in
Gates says that from now on probable cause is to be ascertained by a
"totality of the circumstances analysis," one cannot help but recall the
pre-Miranda experience under the old "totality of the circumstances"
voluntariness test for determining the admissibility of confessions. That
confession standard proved to be a failure because it "left police without
needed guidance" and "impaired the effectiveness and the legitimacy of
judicial review."'' Should that experience now be replicated in the
fourth amendment area as a result of Gates, then Justice Brennan will
have proved fatidical in declaring that "today's decision threatens to
'obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions between our form of
government, where officers are under the law, and the police-state where
they are the law.' 132
One hopes that will not come to pass. It need not if trial and appel-
late courts refuse to abdicate their responsibility to uphold the fourth
amendment's probable cause requirement and do not read Gates as a
total abandonment of standards and rules of law in favor of something
called "common-sense." Gates does not mean that lower courts are writ-
ing on a completely clean slate when they now confront the question of
when an informant's information amounts to probable cause. Even the
Gates majority agreed "that an informant's 'veracity,' 'reliability' and
'basis of knowledge' are all highly relevant in determining the value of
his report."'133 Because this is so, it is to be hoped that courts will con-
tinue to place considerable reliance upon the elaboration of these factors
in earlier cases decided under the now-discarded Aguilar formula.
B. THE PARTIALLY CORROBORATED ANONYMOUS TIP
In concluding that the facts in the affidavit amounted to probable
cause, the Gates majority reasoned as follows: (1) the facts obtained by
independent investigation were alone quite suspicious, since "Florida is
well-known as a source of narcotics and other illegal drugs," and Gates'
observed conduct "is as suggestive of a pre-arranged drug run, as it is of
an ordinary vacation trip"; 134 (2) the anonymous letter was deserving of
some weight because the "corroboration of the letter's predictions that
the Gates' car would be in Florida, that Lance Gates would fly to Flor-
131 Schulhofer, Confessror and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 869 (1981).
132 103 S. Ct. at 2359 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 17 (1948)).
133 103 S. Ct. at 2327.
134 Id at 2334.
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ida in the next day or so, and that he would drive the car north toward
Bloomingdale all indicated, albeit not with certainty, that the inform-
ant's other assertions also were true"; 13 5 and (3) the details in the letter
concerned "future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily pre-
dicted," thus suggesting the writer of the letter "also had access to relia-
ble information of the Gates' alleged illegal activities."' 136 Whether this
reasoning is sound is a most difficult question, one which is not itself
determined by the criticisms stated above. (This is apparent from the
fact that Justice White's concurring opinion roundly condemned the
majority's dismantling of the existing probable cause structure but
nonetheless agreed that the search warrant in Gates had issued on prob-
able cause. 137) But I find the reasoning of the Gates dissenters somewhat
more persuasive.
In concluding that there was probable cause, the majority claimed
that the corroboration showed that "the informant had access to accu-
rate information" of the Gates' "not entirely ordinary travel plans."' 138
Similarly, Justice White asserted that "the police corroborated" the let-
ter's predictions "that Sue Gates would drive to Florida, that Lance
Gates would fly there a few days after May 3, and that Lance would
then drive the car back."' 139 But to the extent that this suggests that the
police had corroborated the rather unusual fast-paced sequence of
events predicted in the letter, it is in error. As Justice Stevens pointed
out in his dissent, the corroboration in Gates actually counts for very
little. For one thing, the limited investigation did not establish when the
wife had gone to Florida; "for all the officers knew she had been in Flor-
ida for a month." 4 For another, it did not establish whether the hus-
band was making an immediate return to Bloomingdale. While the
majority relied on police observation of the Gates' departure north-
bound on an interstate "frequently used by travelers to the Chicago
area,"'14 1 the Stevens dissent correctly noted that "the same highway is
also commonly used by travelers to Disney World, Sea World, and
135 Id at 2335.
136 Id
137 The five Justices who joined the majority opinion did not dispute Justice White's asser-
tion that their result was possible under existing law, but only commented that their reason-
ing would not "satisfy some views," id., of what the two-pronged test required. Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissenting, objected to "the Court's unjustified and ill-
advised rejection of the two-pronged test for evaluating the validity of a warrant based on
hearsay," id. at 2351, under which they concluded the warrant in the instant case was invalid.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan, dissenting, concluded the warrant was invalid
even under the Court's new "totality of the circumstances" test. Id. at 2360-62.
138 Id at 2335.
139 Id at 2349 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
140 Id at 2360 n. 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141 Id at 2326.
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Ringling Brothers and Barnum and Bailey Circus World. It is also the
road to Cocoa Beach, Cape Canaveral, and Washington, D.C."' 142 Con-
sequently, there was nothing inherently imputational in what had been
observed unless all Florida travelers are suspicious because, as the major-
ity says, "Florida is well-known as a source of narcotics and other illegal
drugs."143
But surely that kind of suspicion should not suffice to bootstrap an
anonymous letter up to probable cause, for (as Justice Brennan aptly
noted in his dissent) an anonymous tipster's allegations are more in need
of some significant confirmation than "tips from informants known at
least to the police."' 144 This is especially true in the Gates case. Not only
had the police surveillance there corroborated precious little of the alle-
gations in the anonymous letter, it also established the falsity of one
claim. Both the husband and wife had been seen together in Florida,
thus disproving the implication in the letter that they were never gone
at the same time, a rather critical assertion because it squared with the
further allegation that they already had "over $100,000 worth of drugs
in their basement." Also, it can hardly be said of Gates that either this
minimal corroboration must suffice or anonymous tips of the kind there
received will, as the majority feared, "be of greatly diminished value in
police work."' 145 Because the letter alleged an ongoing criminal scheme
which was unlikely to terminate and which involved not only repeated
travels by the two suspects but also recurrent visits to their house by
drug dealers, the police were hardly confronted with a "now or never"
kind of situation. Numerous avenues of investigation were open to
them. Indeed, even a bit more patience in the surveillance which was
undertaken would have sufficed. As Justice Stevens concluded in his
dissent, had the probable cause determination included one additional
fact which soon came to the attention of the police, "that Lance and Sue
Gates made a 22-hour non-stop drive from West Palm Beach, Florida,
to Bloomingdale, Illinois, only a few hours after Lance had flown to
Florida," then a probable cause finding would have been justified on




142 Id at 2360 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143 Id at 2334.
144 Id. at 2356 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 2331.
146 Id. at 2360 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because that additional and critical fact was
known by the police before the car was actually searched, Justice Stevens would have re-
manded the case for a determination of whether that search could be upheld as a warrantless
search on probable cause under the Carroll-Chambers rule.
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C. PROBABLE CAUSE AND "GOOD FAITH"
After hearing argument in Gates on the question of whether a war-
rant had issued on probable cause, the Court requested reargument on.
an additional issue: "Whether the rule requiring exclusion at a criminal
trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment . . .
should to any extent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the
exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief that the search
and seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth Amendment."'
4 7
Later, "with apologies to all," the Court declined to rule on that issue
because it "was not presented to the Illinois courts."' 14 8 But, as already
discussed, the Court instead adopted a radical change in fourth amend-
ment doctrine which, it seems, accomplished by indirection much of
what the advocates of a "good faith" exception were seeking. Instead of
saying that the officer or magistrate made a reasonable "near miss" on
what suffices for probable cause under the pre-Gates standard and that
consequently the illegally obtained evidence should be admissible under
a "good faith" exception, the Court achieved essentially the same result
by merely dropping the probable cause barrier down a few notches.
Several cases again raising the "good faith" issue will reach the
Court next Term, 149 and thus it is appropriate to ask what bearing Gates
ought to have upon it. By substituting a slogan for a standard, the
147 Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 436, 436 (1982) (order for reargument).
148 103 S. Ct. at 2321. Only Justice White, concurring in the judgment, confronted the
issue, and he concluded that "when officers perform their tasks in the good-faith belief that
their action comported with constitutional requirements, the deterrent function of the exclu-
sionary rule is so minimal, if not non-existent, that the balance clearly favors the rule's modifi-
cation." Id. at 2344. This is especially true, he added, when, as in the instant case, "law
enforcement officers have reasonably relied on ajudicially-issued search warrant." Id. As for
the usual arguments against such an exception, he responded that: (i) it would not cause
magistrates to flout the probable cause requirements, as magistrates generally would not "ab-
dicate their responsibility to apply the law" and exclusion would still be appropriate "when it
is plainly evident that a magistrate or judge had no business issuing a warrant," id. at 2345;
(ii) it would not freeze development of fourth amendment law, as in a case presenting a
"novel question" the Court could decide the violation issue "before turning to the good-faith
question," id. at 2346 (emphasis in original); and (iii) it would not be difficult to apply in
practice, as good faith would be determined by the existence of a warrant or in warrantless
search cases "by objective standards. . . no more difficult to apply than the closely related
good-faith test which governs civil suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 2347.
149 Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982), cert. granted, 103 S.
Ct. 3534 (1983) (holding that evidence seized under a warrant which, because of the issuing
magistrate's good faith negligence, failed to describe items to be seized, must be suppressed);
Colorado v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948 (Colo.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983) (fact that
defendant a stranger in neighborhood, acting suspiciously and in possession of TV set he tried
to conceal not probable cause; good faith of officer cannot validate the seizure), cert. dismissed,
52 U.S.L.W. 3460 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1983) (defendant died); United States v. Leon, a fdwithout
opinion, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983) (district judge properly
suppressed evidence seized pursuant to warrant because affidavit inadequate; court declines
to adopt good faith exception).
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Court in Gates has rendered the meaning of probable cause much more
amphibolic than it had been, which in a perverse sense makes the argu-
ment for a "good faith" exception somewhat more compelling than it
once was. The law is less clear now than it was before Gates and thus, the
argument might proceed, greater is the need to excuse honest mistakes
by police and magistrates as to what the law requires. But that is hardly
a line of reasoning which any member of the Gates majority could in
good conscience put forward, and in any event it is not compelling.
The salient characteristic of Gates is that it contemplates greater
deference at the suppression hearing and appellate review stages to the
judgment of the officer or magistrate who made the initial probable
cause determination. That being so, there is no need to engage in
"double counting" by first applying this less demanding conception of
probable cause and then in addition excusing good faith deviations from
it. If, as the Gates majority beguiles, probable cause is nothing more
than a matter of "practical, common-sense" decisionmaking, then it
would seem that a probable cause determination which is erroneous and
thus lacking this sagaciousness is undeserving of either the appellation
"good faith" or the sympathetic reception which a "good faith" qualifi-
cation would allow.
III. THE BALANCING TEST
A fourth amendment issue of great practical and theoretical impor-
tance concerns when the traditional probable cause standard, whatever
it is, may be "watered down" or even abandoned entirely in permitting
certain types of seizures and searches. This has been accomplished by a
so-called balancing test, typically where rather limited intrusions are
outweighed by compelling public needs. As stated in Terry v. Ohio,'
50
quoting Camara v. Municipal Court,151 this test involves "balancing the
need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or
seizure] entails." One possible consequence of balancing, as in the Terry
stop-and-frisk case, is that the conduct will be permitted under a less
demanding reasonable suspicion standard. Another, as in the Camara
housing inspection case, is that the conduct will be allowed without any
individualized suspicion if undertaken pursuant to an established rou-
tine or plan.
A. AVAILABILITY OF THE BALANCING TEST
One difficult question which has troubled several members of the
Court in recent years concerns the extent to which this balancing pro-
150 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
151 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
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cess should supplant the probable cause requirement. As Justice Black-
mun put it in United States v. Place,152 there "appears . . . to be an
emerging tendency on the part of the Court to convert the Terry decision
into a general statement that the Fourth Amendment requires only that
any seizure be reasonable." This may be attributable in part to the fact
that in the seminal Camara case the Court was not sufficiently careful in
elaborating the circumstances that make a non-probable cause search or
seizure permissible via the balancing test.
153
Though this broader issue is too complex to be assayed here, it is
worth noting that the objection by some Justices to utilization of the
balancing test in two cases last Term seems unwarranted. One of them,
United States v. Place,154 involved the increasingly common practice of
detaining luggage carried by a suspected drug courier at an airport.
Though the majority in Place ultimately concluded that the ninety-min-
ute detention was too long,155 the Court's anterior holding was that the
152 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2652 (1983).
153 See LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment." The Camara and See Cases,
1967 SuP. CT. REV. 1 (1968).
154 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
155 The Court noted that "although we decline to adopt any outside time limitation for a
permissible Teny stop, we have never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-
minute period involved here and cannot do so on the facts presented by this case." Id. at
2646.
In holding that the 90-minute detention of the suitcases was excessive under the fourth
amendment, the Court responded thusly to the government's argument "that seizures of
property are generally less intrusive than seizures of the person" and thus are not subject to
precisely the same temporal limits:
While true in some circumstances, that premise is faulty on the facts we address in this
case. The precise type of detention we confront here is seizure of personal luggage from
the immediate possession of the suspect for the purpose of arranging exposure to a nar-
cotics detection dog. Particularly in the case of detention of luggage within the traveler's
immediate possession, the police conduct intrudes on both the suspect's possessory inter-
est in his luggage as well as his liberty interest in proceeding with his itinerary. The
person whose luggage is detained is technically still free to continue his travels or carry
out other personal activities pending release of the luggage. Moreover, he is not sub-
jected to the coercive atmosphere of a custodial confinement or to the public indignity of
being personally detained. Nevertheless, such a seizure can effectively restrain the person
since he is subjected to the possible disruption of his travel plans in order to remain with
his luggage or to arrange for its return. Therefore, when the police seize luggage from
the suspect's custody, we think the limitations applicable to investigative detentions of
the person should define the permissible scope of an investigative detention of the per-
son's luggage on less than probable cause.
Id. at 2645 (footnote omitted).
A close reading of this language indicates that the Court was not merely saying that on
the facts of the particular case the time limits must be the same, but rather that in all in-
stances of dispossession from the suspect the limits are the same. (If there is any doubt at all
on this point, it is because one of the sentences just quoted merely says that "such a seizure can
effectively restrain the person" (emphasis added), and it is footnoted with this quotation:
"At least when the authorities do not make it absolutely clear how they plan to reunite
the suspect and his possessions at some future time and place, seizure of the object is
tantamount to seizure of the person. This is because that person must either remain on
the scene or else seemingly surrender his effects permanently to the police."
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Teny balancing test was applicable to such activity. On the government
interest side of the scales, the Court put the consideration that
"[b]ecause of the inherently transient nature of drug courier activity at
airports, allowing police to make brief investigative stops of persons at
airports on reasonable suspicion of drug-trafficking substantially en-
hances the likelihood that police will be able to prevent the flow of nar-
cotics into distribution channels.1' 56 As for the nature-and-quality-of-
intrusion pan of the scales, the Court noted that "some brief detentions
of personal effects may be so minimally intrusive of Fourth Amendment
interests that strong countervailing governmental interests will justify a
seizure based only on specific and articulable facts that the property
contains contraband or evidence of a crime."' 5 7 The Court thus
concluded:
[Wihen an officer's observations lead him reasonably to believe that a trav-
eler is carrying luggage that contains narcotics, the principles of Teny and
its progeny would permit the officer to detain the luggage briefly to investi-
gate the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided that the inves-
tigative detention is properly limited in scope.1
5 8
This approach was questioned by three concurring members of the
Court. Justice Blackmun made the comment quoted above and went
on to say that in Teny the Court utilized the balancing test because of
the exceptional circumstances present, a need for " 'necessarily swift ac-
tion predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the
beat.' "159 This characterization, however, is just as appropriate when
Id. at 2645 n.8. (quoting 3 W. LAFAVE,supra note 122, §9.6, at 61). This quite properly leaves
intact the rule of United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970), that a longer detention
is permissible where neither privacy nor possession is disturbed.
In defense of the government's position, this hypothetical case might be put: Place is
stopped at LaGuardia Airport on sufficient suspicion he is a drug courier that it would be
reasonable to hold him with his luggage at the point of the stopping for a period of 15 min-
utes while a drug detection dog is brought to the scene. Unfortunately, the LaGuardia dog is
home with a cold, so the agents, told by Place that his plans are to take a cab to the Plaza
Hotel and later meet friends for dinner, advise him that they are taking his luggage to Ken-
nedy Airport for sniffing by the dog there and that if the dog does not alert the agents will
promptly deliver the luggage to Place's hotel room within an hour and a half. Certainly it is
arguable that in such circumstances the proposed hour and a half dispossession is by no
means comparable to the forbidden hour and a half detention of Place himself, but rather is
equivalent to the permissible 15 minute detention of Place and therefore is a constitutional
alternate procedure. Though this may be correct as an abstract matter, the Court in Place
declined to embrace such reasoning, apparently because it would add another complication
to the Terr, balancing test. As earlier explained in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213
(1979), "the protections intended by the Framers could all too easily disappear" under such a
more sophisticated multifactor balancing test requiring "the consideration and balancing of
the multifarious circumstances presented by different cases."
156 103 S. Ct. at 2643.
157 Id. at 2644.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 2652 n.I (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting T7ry, 392 U.S. at 20).
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the officer's "beat" is an airport.
Justice Brennan (joined, as was Justice Blackmun, by Justice Mar-
shall) objected that (i) "Terry and its progeny did not address seizures of
property"' 60 and (ii) that "there is a difference between incidental
seizures of personal effects," which may happen when a person carrying
luggage is himself detained, "and seizures of property independent of
the seizure of the person," because the latter "significantly expand the
scope of [the intrusion]."1 6 1 The first of these points, which underlies
Justice Brennan's exprobation that Place constitutes "a radical depar-
ture from settled Fourth Amendment principles,"' 62 is far from compel-
ling. To say that this issue was not anticipated and addressed in Terry
indicates nothing about how it should now be resolved, and the outcome
in Place is hardly any more radical than that in Terry, the first case to
uphold seizure of a person on less than probable cause.
As for the second point, the assertion that the seizure of effects per-
mitted by Place serves to "significantly expand the scope of [the intru-
sion]," this simply is not so. There is no extension in a temporal sense,
for the Court in Place ruled that effects taken from a suspect's possession
may be detained only so long as the suspect himself could be held.
163
Justice Brennan's assumption thus must be that there is an extension in
the sense of a more serious kind of intrusion, referred to by him as "dis-
possession of his personal effects."' 164 But what makes that more serious
than the permissible alternative is never explained. Assuming a case
where under Terry a suspected drug courier could be detained where
stopped for fifteen minutes until a drug detection dog could be brought
there to inhale his suitcase, it is difficult to see why it is more intrusive to
dispossess the suspect of his luggage and take it to the dog with the un-
derstanding that if probable cause for seizure does not develop the bags
will be returned in fifteen minutes. 65 That is, fifteen minutes of dispos-
160 103 S. Ct. at 2650 (Brennan, J., concurring).
161 Id. at 2649 (Brennan, J., concurring).
162 Id.
163 Justice Brennan's concurrence proceeds as if the majority had not so held, and in dis-
cussing the instant case says that when the officers did not develop probable cause in their
encounter with Place "they had to let him go" and that their seizure of his luggage at that
point was "an independent dispossession of his personal effects" which makes the total intru-
sion "more severe." Id. at 2650 (Brennan, J., concurring). But if it is true that the circum-
stances were such that no further detention of Place would have been permissible, then under
the majority's formulation no dispossession of the effects would have been permissible at that
point either.
164 103 S. Ct. at 2650 (Brennan, J., concurring).
165 Since the Court in Place required adherence to "the limitations applicable to investiga-
tive detentions of the person," id. at 2645; see supra, note 163, why did the Court go on to say
that in the instant case
the violation was exacerbated by the failure of the agents to accurately inform respon-
dent of the place to which they were transporting his luggage, of the length of time he
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session is not more intrusive than fifteen minutes of detention. 66
More troublesome is Michigan v. Long, 167 where two officers, patrol-
ling in a rural area after midnight, saw a car travelling erratically and at
excessive speed swerve into a ditch, so they stopped to investigate.
Long, the sole occupant of the vehicle, met the officers at the rear of his
automobile but started back toward its open door when asked for his
vehicle registration. The officers saw a hunting knife on the floor, and
one officer then shined a light into the car to seek other weapons. Upon
seeing something protruding from under the armrest, the officer reached
in, lifted the armrest, and found an open pouch of marijuana. In up-
holding this police action, the Court ruled:
[T]he search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to
those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if
the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific and ar-
ticulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant" the officers in believing that the suspect is
dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.
168
The Court emphasized that this "does not mean that the police may
conduct automobile searches whenever they conduct an investigative
stop," since "officers who conduct area searches during investigative de-
tentions must do so only when they have the level of suspicion identified
in Terqy."1
69
Two of the dissenters 170 in Long remonstrated that the "intrusion
might be dispossessed, and of what arrangements would be made for return of the lug-
gage if the investigation dispelled the suspicion?
Id. at 2646. Does this mean that the result would have been different if the agents had ad-
vised Place what they intended to do with the luggage and, instead of merely giving him their
phone number, had explained how long it would take and how they would get the suitcases
back to him, as in the hypothetical put in supra note 163? Apparently not. Rather, this
language taken with that quoted there suggests that police who do not sufficiently advise the
suspect about the dimensions of the dispossession will thereby invalidate an otherwise lawful
seizure of effects. For example, assume again that Place could have been held with his lug-
gage where stopped for 15 minutes and that consequently under the Court's analysis the
agents could also dispossess Place of the suitcases for 15 minutes. If the agents without suffi-
cient explanation simply disappeared with the suitcases and then reappeared there 15 min-
utes later but could not terminate the dispossession because Place was gone, certainly the
resulting continuation of the intrusion beyond that permissible should be charged to the po-
lice rather than to Place. This is because Place was not properly advised as to how he could
minimize the interference with his travels and his possession of the luggage.
166 Indeed, it might be argued that when the investigative technique to be used is a drug
detection dog, then the dispossession is actually less intrusive because the technique may be
utilized in circumstances not embarrassing to the suspect. See supra text following note 64.
167 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
168 Id. at 3480 (quoting Ten,, 392 U.S. at 21).
169 Id. at 3480 n.14 (emphasis in original).
170 Justices Brennan and Marshall. Two other Justices, Justice Blackmun, concurring, and
Justice Stevens, dissenting, disagreed with the majority's other ruling that if a state court
decision appears to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law, then it
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involved in this case is precisely 'the kind of intrusion associated with an
arrest' " and that consequently there "is no justification. . . for 'balanc-
ing' the relevant interests." 171 But, while it may be true that a search
into a suspect's vehicle is a somewhat greater intrusion than the search
of the person permitted under Terry,'1 72 it is more limited 173 than the
search which may be made incident to an arrest of an occupant of the
car. 174 Also, it serves a compelling governmental interest-as it was put
in Terry, "the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not
armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against him." 175 As even the two dissenters acknowledged, "police
should not be exposed to unnecessary danger in the performance of their
duties."'' 76 As an abstract proposition, therefore, the extention of the
Terry protective search concept to vehicles is unobjectionable.
B. "LESS INTRUSIVE MEANS" AND BALANCING TEST SEARCHES
The Long majority's nonsequacious application and elaboration of
this rule is another matter, however. The Court unfortunately took a
most expansive view of what constitutes danger in the context of a Terry
stop of a person in an automobile. As a result, Long can easily be read
by lower courts so inclined as conferring on police the power to make
extensive vehicle searches without probable cause incident to virtually
any lawful stopping of a vehicle. It is thus quite fair to say, as the dis-
senters warn, that "the implications of the Court's decision are frighten-
will be presumed that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed
federal law required it to do so, meaning that in such circumstances an independent state
ground will exist only if the state court decision clearly and expressly indicates that it is
alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent state grounds.
171 103 S. Ct. at 3487 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172 A search into a vehicle is bound to be more intrusive in some respects, as the area of
intrusion is greater and it is not feasible to limit the search by the two-step, pat-down-first
procedure applicable to the person of the suspect. But that may be offset to some extent by
the fact that a search of one's person carries a greater degree of offensiveness with it.
173 Just how much more limited is, unfortunately, one of the ambiguities in Long. The
Long holding says that the search must be (i) confined to "the passenger compartment of an
automobile," and (ii) "limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden."
103 S. Ct. at 3480. The second limitation does not also apply in search incident to arrest
situations, see infra note 174, but its significance depends largely upon such questions as
whether the term "weapon" in this context includes such possibilities as a razor blade and
also whether a soft container must in any event be patted down first.
174 Under New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981), "when a policeman has made a
lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile," inclusive of
"the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment."
175 392 U.S. at 23.
176 103 S. Ct. at 3488 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ing."' 177 In particular, the Long majority's analysis is flawed in three
significant respects: (i) as to whether the officer is obligated to take any
steps to minimize the danger that might otherwise exist; (ii) as to when a
sufficient likelihood of danger exists in terms of the suspect's possible
access to the vehicle; and (iii) as to when, assuming access, a suspect is
sufficiently likely to be armed and dangerous.
Unquestionably the most perverse aspect of Long is the Court's as-
sertion that because a Terry investigation " 'at close range' " requires the
officer to make a "'quick decision as to how to protect himself and
others from possible danger,' " there is no requirement whatsoever "that
officers adopt alternative means to ensure their safety in order to avoid
the intrusion involved in a Terry encounter."' 178 In other words, if an
officer could avoid any risk of the suspect getting at any possible weapon
in the car by having him exit and move away from the vehicle,' 79 he
may ignore that alternative and thereby create a continuing danger that
justifies a search inside the automoble for which the officer lacks prob-
able cause. No authority is cited to support this bootstrapping principle
because there is none. Indeed, Te ry and its progeny point in the oppo-
site direction. In Terry, the Court stressed that a search for weapons
must "be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies" and "limited to that
which is necessary,"' 180 which is hardly consistent with this new notion
that the police are free to fashion their own exigencies and necessities.
In Adams v. Williams,181 the Court upheld police action more intrusive
than previously authorized in Terry, but did so only after emphasizing
that the officer tried to avoid the necessity for such action by first re-
questing the suspect "to step out of the car so that his movements could
more easily be seen." And in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the Court's recogni-
tion that police must have carte blanche to order any lawfully stopped
driver out of his vehicle was grounded in the conclusion that such action
"reduces the likelihood that the officer will be the victim of an as-
sault."' 82 Because it most certainly does with respect to the likelihood of
assault with any weapons in the car, it is particularly unfortunate that
the Court in Long permitted (indeed, emboldened) officers to forego that
alternative and similar protective measures and thereby gain the prerog-
ative to make searches without probable cause. Had the Court in Long
instead indicated that alternative protective measures should be utilized
177 Id. at 3487 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178 Id. at 3482.
179 The Court previously had held that such a precautionary measure is a lawful course of
action incident to any lawful stopping. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
180 392 U.S. at 26.
181 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972).
182 434 U.S. at 110.
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whenever feasible, the decision would have permitted protective
searches of vehicles in a relatively small (and tolerable) number of cases.
A second iniquitous feature of Long is the breadth with which the
Court describes the likelihood of a suspect's access to his car which will
suffice (if the Terry "may be armed and presently dangerous" test is
otherwise met) to justify search into the vehicle. The Court's holding
indicates that such a search is permissible only if, inter alia, the officer
reasonably believes "the suspect may gain immediate control of weap-
ons."' 183 This would seem to encompass a reasonable judgment about
the suspect's ability in the particular circumstances to get back into the
car. Yet, the Court rather summarily dismissed the lower court's ruling
that there was no need for a vehicle search in the instant case because
Long was then in the control of the officers.18 4 Though the lower court's
conclusion seems especially justified in Long, where the apparently
dazed suspect was alone and in the custody of two armed officers at the
rear of a vehicle which had swerved into a ditch, the Supreme Court
countered that "a Terry suspect in Long's position [might] break away
from police control and retrieve a weapon from his automobile."' 18 5
Whether the Court would have made the same pronouncement on other
facts-e.g., if Long had taken a seat in the police car-is unclear. But
this language is certainly susceptible to the interpretation that a "break
away" ability is to be assumed without regard to the facts of the particu-
lar case. If that is what the Court intends, then Long, in this respect,
creates a "bright line" just as pernicious as the one in New York v.
Belton. 186
On this matter of access to weapons, the Court in Long offered an-
other possibility: "[Tjhe suspect may be permitted to reenter the vehicle
before the Terry investigation is over, and again, may have access to
weapons." 87 Indeed, that was the situation in Long, for the suspect, at
the officers' request, was about to get into his car to obtain the vehicle
registration. But, unless one accepts the Court's notion that the police
need take no alternative measures to ensure their safety, there is no rea-
son why a suspect thought to be dangerous should be allowed to reenter
his car for that purpose. As the dissenters noted, the police could have
continued to detain respondent outside the car and asked him to tell
them where his registration was and "then could have retrieved the re-
183 103 S. Ct. at 3480.
184 Michigan v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 320 N.W.2d 866 (1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
185 103 S. Ct. at 3481.
186 453 U.S. 454 (1981), criticized in this respect in LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an
Imperfect World.- On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith", 43 U. PIr. L. REv. 307, 324-33
(1982); see supra note 174.
187 103 S. Ct. at 3482.
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gistration themselves," which "would have resulted in an intrusion sub-
stantially less severe than the one at issue here." 18 8
The third type of access identified by the Long majority is that
which often occurs at the conclusion of a Terry stop: "[I]f the suspect is
not placed under arrest, he will be permitted to reenter his automobile,
and he will then have access to any weapons inside." 89 There is no
denying that such propinquity will occur with some frequency, but it is
not likely to create any danger to the officer. To justify a protective
search, Terry instructs, there must be a reasonable belief that the suspect
is "armed and presently dangerous." Except perhaps in extraordinary
circumstances, no such belief will exist as to post-detention access, for it
is most unlikely that a suspect would want to attack the officer who had
just told him he was free to go. In Long, for example, it seems fanciful to
suggest that if the police had concluded that he was not intoxicated and
had permitted him to go his way, perhaps after issuing a ticket for
speeding, there was any appreciable risk that Long would have returned
to his car, obtained a weapon, and tried to attack the officers before they
left the scene.
In support of its conclusion that the danger to officers in the context
of vehicle stops is such as to justify the broad search power conferred,
the Court in Long relied upon an empirical study of police shootings
published in this Journal19 0 and relied upon by the Court in the past. 191
But a closer examination of that research discloses that it does not give
credence to the Long analysis. The study reported that of police officers
shot in connection with vehicle stops, about half were shot by persons
seated in or concealed in a car, about a third by persons standing
outside the car talking to the police, and the rest by persons then exiting
the car or fleeing the scene. Quite clearly, a power to search the car is
neither adequate nor necessary to protect the police in any of those situ-
ations. No mention is made in the study of any instance in which a
person outside the car returned to the vehicle and then shot the officer.
Thus, it is quite understandable why the author does not propose that
police be allowed to search cars, but rather that they maintain better
"vehicle occupant control while issuing traffic tickets, interrogating, or
[performing] other routine police business."'
19 2
Next, the Court in Long seems to imply that rather generous pre-
188 Id. at 3488 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189 Id. at 3481.
190 Bristow, Police Ofjier Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE SCI. 93 (1963).
191 E.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977); United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n.3 (1972).
192 Bristow, supra note 190, at 95.
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sumptions may be entertained as to what types of suspects might be
armed and dangerous, that is, might have a weapon in the vehicle and
be motivated to use it against the officer or others in the event of access
to the vehicle. Where, as in Tery, the observed activity appeared "to be
preface to a 'stick-up,' " then surely (as the Court there concluded) the
officer was "warranted in believing petitioner was armed and thus
presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his
suspicious behavior."1 93 But in Long the suspected offense was driving
while intoxicated; as the dissenters noted, "A drunk driver is indeed
dangerous while driving, but not while stopped on the roadside by the
police. 1 94 And while the officers had seen an apparently lawful hunting
knife in the car, not a particularly remarkable discovery in rural Michi-
gan, that sheds little if any light on the questions of whether there is
another weapon in the car (which the Court said the officer was prop-
erly searching for when the marijuana was discovered) or whether Long
was at all likely to make use of any weapon. The same may be said of
the other factors relied upon by the Court, such as that the stopping
occurred late at night and in a rural area. Lower courts have under-
standably usually required more than this to justify a Terry search. 195
Likewise objectionable for its failure to heed the Terry proviso that
searches under the balancing test must be "limited to that which is nec-
essary" is illinois v. Lafayette)96 The Court there held "that it is not 'un-
reasonable' for police, as part of the routine procedure incident to
incarcerating an arrested person, to search any container or article in his
possession, in accordance with established inventory procedures."1 9 7 As
for the lower court's conclusion that the inventory of all of the arrestee's
effects was unnecessary because "the defendant's shoulder bag could
easily have been secured by sealing it within a plastic bag or box and
placing it in a secured locker,"1 98 the Supreme Court responded:
We are hardly in a position to second-guess police departments as to what
practical administrative method will best deter theft by and false claims
against its employees and preserve the security of the stationhouse. It is
evident that a stationhouse search of every item carried on or by a person
who has lawfully been taken into custody by the police will amply serve
the important and legitimate governmental interests involved.
Even if less intrusive means existed of protecting some particular types
of property, it would be unreasonable to expect police officers in the every-
day course of business to make fine and subtle distinctions in deciding
193 Tey, 392 U.S. at 28.
194 103 S. Ct. at 3487 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
195 See cases discussed in 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 122, at § 9.4(a).
196 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983).
197 Id. at 2611.
198 99 Ill. App. 3d 830, 835, 425 N.E.2d 1383, 1386 (1981).
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which containers or items may be searched and which must be sealed as a
unit. 199
This repudiation of the lower court's "less intrusive means" ap-
proach is troublesome at best. The Court correctly noted that it had
previously rejected that reasoning in South Dakota v. Oppennan200 and
Cady v. Dombrowski,20 1 but the alternative understandably dismissed in
those cases was the expensive procedure of posting a guard with a vehi-
cle for some substantial period of time. Police departments presumably
have secure areas where small effects can be stored, and thus the alterna-
tive urged in Lafayette seems much less impracticable. Indeed, the Court
had stressed on an earlier occasion that the difficulties it had described
in Opperman and Cady did not carry over to situations involving contain-
ers.20 2 Perhaps Lafayette is not of great practical importance in its partic-
ular application because of the tendency of courts to view containers in
an arrestee's immediate possession as "fair game" under the Robinson-
Belton search-incident-to-arrest rule.20 3 But it is nonetheless worrisome
when viewed as precedent for the casuistic proposition that the existence
of less intrusive alternatives is generally irrelevant in fourth amendment
adjudication.
C. "LEAST INTRUSIVE MEANS" AND BALANCING TEST SEIZURES
In Florida v. Royer,2 4 a suspected drug courier was lawfully ques-
tioned in an airport concourse and then required to accompany the po-
lice about forty feet to a small police office, where the suspect consented
to a search of his suitcases after they were obtained from the airline and
brought to the room. Although the total elapsed time was fifteen min-
utes, the four-Justice plurality in Royer concluded that the consent was
the fruit of an illegal arrest. In the course of reaching that conclusion,
the Royer plurality placed great emphasis upon two points: (i) that "an
investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"; 20 5 and (ii) that "the
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means rea-
sonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short pe-
riod of time.
'20o
The first of these two principles (at least if unadorned by the sec-
ond) is certainly unobjectionable and fully consistent with the previ-
199 103 S. Ct. at 2610.
200 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
201 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
202 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
203 See 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.5(a) (1978).
204 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
205 Id. at 1325.
206 Id.
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ously discussed notion that intrusions under the balancing test should be
kept to the necessary minimum. But the second appears to impose a
more onerous burden than is reflected in prior cases. As the Royer plu-
rality explained,
the State has not touched on the question whether it would have been
feasible to investigate the contents of Royer's bags in a more expeditious
way. The courts are not strangers to the use of trained dogs to detect the
presence of controlled substances in luggage. There is no indication here
that this means was not feasible and available. If it had been used, Royer
and his luggage could have been momentarily detained while this investi-
gative procedure was carried out. Indeed, it may be that no detention at
all would have been necessary. A negative result would have freed Royer
in short order; a positive result would have resulted in his justifiable arrest
on probable cause.
20 7
In other words, the Royer plurality opinion appears to mean 20 8 that a
Terry stop can become an arrest (and consequently an illegal one if
probable cause is then lacking) if it appears that the police could have
utilized some other means of investigation which it is believed would
have been less intrusive.
Although only four Justices joined in that language, it is most note-
worthy that Justice Brennan, concurring, while unwilling to concede
"that the use of trained narcotics dogs constitutes a less intrusive means
207 Id. at 1328-29 (footnote omitted).
208 To the extent that there is some uncertainty as to exactly what the plurality's position
is, it is because this "least intrusive means" point is connected to concern about movement of
the suspect to another location, which is itself expressed none too clearly. At one point it is
asserted that it is consistent with the conclusion that Royer was under arrest that he would
not have been free to leave the room. But this is misleading, as inability to leave (or, more
precisely, that a reasonable man would believe he is not free to leave, see supra text accompa-
nying note 72, only establishes that there was some kind of seizure, not whether it is of the
arrest or Teny variety. Equally perplexing for the same reason is the assertion that "the of-
ficers' conduct was more intrusive than necessary to effectuate an investigative detention
otherwise authorized by the Teny line of cases." Id. at 1328. Moreover, the plurality appears
not to have recognized the point made by Justice Blackmun in his dissent, that the suspect,
even if he had already been seized, could nonetheless have consented to have the detention
continue in the room rather than in the concourse. Id. at 1334-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Yet another possible interpretation of the plurality's concern over the movement of the
suspect is that they believe that under Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), any
transportation of the suspect to the coercive surroundings of a police facility, no matter how
near, transforms the situation into an arrest. This is suggested by these comments concerning
Royer.
He found himself in a small room-a large closet-equipped with a desk and two chairs.
He was alone with two police officers who again told him that they thought he was
carrying narcotics. He also found that the officers, without his consent, had retrieved his
checked luggage from the airlines. What had begun as a consensual inquiry in a public
place had escalated into an investigatory procedure in a police interrogation room,
where the police, unsatisfied with previous explanations, sought to confirm their
suspicions.
103 S. Ct. at 1327.
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of conducting a lawful Teny stop," 20 9 expressed a view which-if any-
thing-was even more demanding: "[A] lawful stop must be so strictly
limited that it is difficult to conceive of a less intrusive means that would
be effective to accomplish the purpose of the stop."2t 0 Consequently, one
might well conclude that this "least intrusive means" concept has the
support of a majority of the Court. (If there is doubt about this, it may
be because later the same Term, as discussed earlier, the Court rejected
a "least intrusive means" theory in circumstances where it was much
more compelling than in Royer.)
The other four members of the Court took serious exception to this
new "least intrusive means" principle. Justice Rehnquist declared:
All this to my mind adds up to little more than saying that if my aunt
were a man, she would be my uncle. The officers might have taken differ-
ent steps than they did to investigate Royer, but the same may be said of
virtually every investigative encounter that has more than one step to it.
The question we must decide is what was unreasonable about the steps which
these ofjwers took with respect to thi suspect in the Miami Airport on this
particular day.2
11
The dissenters' concern is justified. This is not to suggest that a
"least intrusive means" inquiry has no place in the Teny balancing pro-
cess; for the reasons already stated, the Court would have been well ad-
vised to pursue that approach in Long and Lafayette. But in the present
case, where unlike Long the question is not whether there will or will not
be a certain fourth amendment intrusion (there a vehicle search, here a
seizure of the person), but rather how extensive it may be, and where in
addition the consideration of alternatives is likely to involve numerous
imponderables, a "least intrusive means" inquiry has a great potential
for mischief. It is likely to result in unrealistic second-guessing of the
police.
This is especially true if a court were to go about it in the fashion
suggested by the Royer plurality opinion. Under the approach taken
there, apparently any possible alternative investigative technique is to
be presumed more expeditious than the one chosen by the police until
the prosecution proves otherwise. Because of an absence of such proof,
the plurality seems to assume that the use of a detection dog would be
"more expeditious. 2 1 2 It said that the officers should have detained
209 Id. at 1331 (Brennan, J., concurring). This occurred before the Court later that Term
held that use of a drug detection dog against unaccompanied luggage in a public place was
no search. United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983). Use of a dog in certain other
circumstances, however, may be fourth amendment activity. See supra text accompanying
note 61.
210 103 S. Ct. at 1331 n.* (Brennan, J., concurring).
211 Id. at 1340 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
212 Id. at 1328.
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Royer "for the brief period during which Florida authorities at busy
airports seem able to carry out the dog-sniffing procedure,"2 1 3 though
(as the Court was to learn later the same Term2 1 4) these dogs are not
always that readily available. The plurality implied that seeking con-
sent is not as expeditous, but (again, as the Court was to learn later that
Term2 15 ) consent might be very promptly obtained. If not, or if there is
not time for a search before the suspect's flight departs, the suspect
might be allowed to go his way and the investigation continued at his
destination. The plurality also intimated that the procedure followed
was unduly intrusive because of the move to the room some 40 feet
away. As the dissenters quite properly asked, however:
Would it have been more "reasonable" to interrogate Royer about the
contents of his suitcases, and to seek his permission to open the suitcases
when they were retrieved, in the busy main concourse of the Miami Air-
port, rather than to find a room off the concourse where the confrontation
would surely be less embarrassing to Royer?
2 1 6
D. SEIZURE ABSENT REASONABLE SUSPICION OR
ESTABLISHED ROUTINE
Finally, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez2 17 must be noted. This
case is especially significant because it pushed the balancing test well
beyond its applications in Camara and Terry. As noted earlier, under the
balancing test the Court has heretofore allowed certain police actions
upon a reasonable suspicion (as in Terry) or pursuant to an established
routine ensuring against arbitrariness (as in Camara).2 18 But in Vil-
lamonte-Marquez, the Court upheld the statutory authority of customs of-
ficers to " 'at any time go on board of any vessel. . . at any place in the
United States. .. and examine the manifest and other documents and
papers.' "219 Thus, the Court for the first time upheld fourth amend-
ment activity not grounded in either a reasonable suspicion or an estab-
lished routine such as a checkpoint operation. The Court offered these
reasons for doing so:
213 Id. at 1328 n.10.
214 In United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983), the suspect's luggage was held for 90
minutes so that it could be taken from LaGuardia Airport to Kennedy Airport in New York
City, where there was such a dog available.
215 In United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983), the suspect promptly consented to a
search of his bags in Miami but he was allowed to depart instead because his flight was about
to leave; the investigation was continued when he arrived in New York.
216 103 S. Ct. at 1340 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
217 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
218 See supra text accompanying notes 150 and 151.
219 103 S. Ct. at 2575 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1976)). Though the statute read liter-
ally appears to confer greater authority upon customs officers, the Court considered only their
power to board for document inspections.
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In a lineal ancestor to the statute at issue here the First Congress clearly
authorized the suspicionless boarding of vessels, reflecting its view that
such boardings are not contrary to the Fourth Amendment; this gives the
statute before us an impressive historical pedigree. Random stops without
any articulable suspicion of vehicles away from the border are not permis-
sible under the Fourth Amendment,. .. but stops at fixed checkpoints or
at roadblocks are. . . . The nature of waterborne commerce in waters
providing ready access to the open sea is sufficiently different from the
nature of vehicular traffic on highways as to make possible alternatives to
the sort of "stop" made in this case less likely to accomplish the obviously
essential governmental purposes involved. The system of prescribed out-
ward warnings used by States for vehicle registration is also significantly
different than the system of external markings on vessels, and the extent
and type of documentation required by federal law is a good deal more
variable and more complex than are the state vehicle registration laws.
The nature of the governmental interests in assuring compliance with doc-
umentation requirements, particularly in waters where the need to deter or
apprehend smugglers is great, are substantial; the type of intrusion made
in this case, while not minimal, is limited.
220
One hopes that V'llamonle-Marquez does not serve as a precedent for
any other such generous conferral of law enforcement authority, as the
majority's reasoning has little to commend it. For one thing, the as-
serted "impressive historical pedigree" is nonexistent. 221 For another,
the V'/llamonte-Marquez case is another instance in which, unfortunately,
the availability of less intrusive means doesn't count. In response to the
majority's assertion that Congress need not choose a registration system
comparable to that used by the states for autos,222 the dissenters co-
gently commented: "It is unseemly at best for the Government to re-
frain from implementing a simple, effective, and unintrusive law
enforcement device, and then to argue to this Court that the absence of
such a device justifies an unprecedented invasion of constitutionally
guaranteed liberties. ' 223 Moreover, what the majority calls "only a
modest intrusion" is much more serious than the stopping at issue in
Prouse, since it involves an actual boarding of what serves for many as a
temporary dwelling. For these reasons, there is much to be said for the.
dissenters' position that "if random stops by roving patrols are neces-
sary, they [should] be subjected to some sort of neutral selection system
220 103 S. Ct. at 2582.
221 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissenting, objected that the statute passed
by the First Congress was a border-search statute, applicable only to vessels entering the
country, while the present statute, enacted in 1922, "purported to authorize suspicionless
boardings of vessels without regard to whether there had been any border crossing." Id. at
2586 n.7.
222 In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), the Court concluded that because of the
state's vehicle registration system, there was no need to permit the random stopping of vehi-
cles to ascertain compliance with registration requirements.
223 103 S. Ct. at 2590 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that would decrease the opportunity for arbitrariness or harassment. 224
IV. THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Because the fourth amendment says nothing about when a warrant
is required, a recurring and difficult issue concerns the circumstances in
which a seizure or a search may be made without a warrant. The
Supreme Court's traditional teaching is that the prior judgment of a
judicial officer is ordinarily to be preferred. The warrant process, the
Court has said, "interposes an orderly procedure" 22 5 involving "judicial
impartiality"2 26 whereby "a neutral and detached magistrate" 227 can
make "informed and deliberate determinations ' '22 8 on the issue of prob-
able cause. To leave such decisions to the police is to allow "'hurried
action' "229 by those "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of fer-
reting out crime. '"230 Yet, the Court has often recognized exceptions to
the warrant requirement.
It is clear that some fourth amendment interests are considered
more important than others when it comes to determining whether an
intrusion upon them ordinarily should be allowed only with the prior
approval of a magistrate. Paramount is the privacy in one's dwelling, as
is reflected by the fact that the Court has declined to permit a warrant-
less search of premises even upon a fairly convincing showing of exigent
circumstances. 23 1 By comparison, the seizure of a person which does not
involve entry of private premises232 is permissible without a warrant
even absent any showing of exigent circumstances. 2 33  As for
automobiles, they are generally subject to search without a warrant. At
one time this was explained by an unconvincing claim of exigent cir-
cumstances, 234 but the rationale now is that vehicles have a "diminished
expectation of privacy. '235 As for other containers, under United States v.
224 Id. at 2590 n.10.
225 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
226 Id.
227 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
228 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964).
229 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 110 (quoting United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932)).
23OJohnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
231 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
232 In the event of such entry a warrant is required absent true exigent circumstances.
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (search warrant required for entry of third-
party premises); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (arrest warrant needed for defend-
ant's own premises).
233 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). But "the Fourth Amendment requires a
judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint on liberty
following arrest." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
234 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
235 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
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Chadwick236 and Arkansas v. Sanders2 37 they carry a greater privacy expec-
tation than cars and, accordingly, are not covered by a general warrant-
less search rule. The Chadwick-Sanders rule was recently reaffirmed in
United States v. Ross,238 thus renewing interest in the question of what
special circumstances permit the warrantless opening of a container.
Two cases last Term touched upon that issue.
A. CONTENTS "INFERRED FROM THEIR OUTWARD APPEARANCE"
In footnote 13 of the Sanders case, quoted with apparent approval in
Ross,239 the Court said:
Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of a
search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus,
some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their
very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because
their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly,
in some cases the contents of a package will be open to "plain view,"
thereby obviating the need for a warrant.
240
Except in the easy case where there is unquestionably a plain view
in the sense of a direct observation of the contents because the container
is partially open or transparent, 24 1 it is unclear what situations footnote
13 is intented to cover. One possibility is plain view once removed, as
where, to use the language of the plurality in Robbins v. Califomia,242 "the
distinctive configuration of a container proclaims its contents." The
Sanders illustration of "a gun case" is such a situation. But the other
illustration given by the Sanders Court, "a kit of burglar tools," though
accepted by the Robbins plurality as among "the very model of excep-
tions which prove the rule, '243 cannot be explained on the same basis.
There is no "distinctive configuration" which, standing alone, identifies
the contents of a container enclosing burglar tools. Thus, there is an
inherent ambiguity in the footnote 13 exception: was the burglar tools
hypothetical merely an ill-considered example, or was it intended to
suggest that there are still other situations in which no warrant is
required?
The Robbins case illustrates the significance of this question. Each
of the packages searched without a warrant in that case "resembles an
236 433 U.s. 1 (1977).
237 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
238 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
239 Id. at 814 n.19 (quoting Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764 n.13).
240 442 U.S. at 764 n.13.
241 Tillman v. State, 275 Ark. 275, 630 S.W.2d 5 (1982) (garment bag partially open, re-
vealing stolen goods), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1185 (1983); State v. Schrier, 283 N.W.2d 338
(Iowa 1979) (clear plastic bag of marijuana protruding from knapsack).




oversized, extra-long cigar box with slightly rounded corners and edg-
es," ".wrapped or boxed in an opaque material covered by an outer
wrapping of transparent, cellophane-type plastic" and "sealed on the
outside with at least one strip of opaque tape. '2 44 The California court
of appeals concluded that these packages fell within the footnote 13 ex-
ception of Sanders, since "[a]ny experienced observer could have inferred
from the appearance of the packages that they contained bricks of mari-
juana."245 But the Robbins plurality disagreed; noting that the searching
officer testified he "had heard" that marijuana was so packaged but
"had never seen" such a package before, they said:
This vague testimony certainly did not establish that marijuana is or-
dinarily "packaged in this way." Expectations of privacy are established
by general social norms, and to fall within the second exception of the
footnote in question a container must so clearly announce its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that
its contents are obvious to an observer. If indeed a green plastic wrapping
reliably indicates that a package could only contain marijuana, that fact
was not shown by the evidence of record in this case.
24 6
This strongly suggests that those four Justices declined to accept
Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that the officer "was aware that contra-
band was often wrapped in this fashion, '24 7 for they believed that this
was not (as Rehnquist put it) "a fact of which all those who watch the
evening news are surely aware, '2 48 but rather a fact which could be es-
tablished only by a stronger showing of the officer's relevant experience
and expertise. The "or otherwise" in the Robbins plurality opinion thus
seems to mean at least this: even if the contents of the container are not
seen, felt, smelled, or revealed by the shape of the container, the
container still does not deserve the full protections of the fourth amend-
ment if the character of the container alone suffices to "clearly an-
nounce" its contents. 249 So stated, the rule appears to require (i) a high
degree of certainty about the contents of the container (ii) ascertained
from the nature of the container itself.
It must be asked whether the first of these possible requirements
calls for a higher degree of probability than is necessary under the prob-
able cause test and, if so, how much higher. This question logically
244 Id. at 422 n.1.
245 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 40, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 783 (1980).
246 Robbins, 453 U.S. at 428.
247 Id. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
248 Id.
249 For example, if a brick-shaped object with rounded edges in a plastic container clearly
announces that it contains marijuana and if a small glassine or tinfoil package or a tied-up
balloon clearly announces that it contains illegal drugs, then these containers may be
searched without a warrant.
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leads to the recent case of Texas v. Brown ,250 where, after a car was
stopped at a routine driver's license checkpoint, an officer saw the driver
drop a knotted opaque party balloon onto the seat and then observed
several small plastic vials, quantities of loose white powder and an open
bag of party balloons in the glove compartment. The officer then seized
the balloon, which a police chemist later determined contained heroin.
The defendant challenged the warrantless seizure of the balloon, and
the court below decided in his favor, ruling that the state could not avail
itself of the "plain view" doctrine because the officer did not know that
incriminating evidence was before him. 25' The four-Justice plurality
opinion, addressing this "plain view" theory, concluded that it required
not the "near certainty" assumed by the court below but only probable
cause. They then determined "that Officer Maples possessed probable
cause to believe that the balloon in Brown's hand contained an illicit
substance. "252
If plain view excuses a warrant and is established by a showing of
probable cause, then it appears that Chadwick-Sanders has been reduced
to the nonsense proposition that no warrant is needed to search any ob-
servable container for which a warrant could lawfully issue. But this is
not what Brown means, which would have been more apparent had the
plurality eschewed its infelicitous plain view analysis. It is noteworthy
that at no point does the plurality refer to Sanders or in any way suggest
that it is interpreting the footnote 13 exception. More importantly, the
question of when a warrant is needed to search a container was not even
before the Court. The defendant inexplicably raised only the question of
the warrantless seizure of the balloon, and only that issue was addressed
by the Supreme Court. As the three concurring Justices pointed out,
that is a relatively easy issue and one which, under the Court's prior
decisions, can be best resolved without becoming entangled in the troub-
lesome concept of "plain view." The seizure of a container requires only
probable cause, but it does not follow from this that a warrantless search
of the container would also be permissible.2 53 Rather, absent probable
cause to search the entire car,254 a warrant is necessary unless the case
250 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983).
251 617 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1981).
252 103 S. Ct. at 1543.
253 They correctly noted, after citing Ross, Chadwick, and Sanders: "All of these cases...
demonstrate that the constitutionality of a container search is not automatically determined
by the constitutionality of the prior seizure." Id. at 1546-47 (Stevens, J., concurring).
254 Actually, in Brown it appears that there was probable cause to search the entire car, so
that under Ross (not yet decided when the Texas court ruled in the instant case) that would
be the easiest basis upon which to uphold the search of the container. As the three concurring
Justices noted, "it is entirely possible that what the officer saw in the car's glove compart-
ment, coupled with his observation of respondent and the contents of his pockets, provided
1983] 1217
WA YNE . LA FA VE
may be brought within footnote 13 of Sanders. What is required, as these
three Justices noted, is "a degree of certainty that is equivalent to the
plain view of the heroin itself," that is, a "virtual certainty that the bal-
loon contained a controlled substance." 255 Whether this "virtual cer-
tainty" test will evolve as the standard under footnote 13 of Sanders
remains to be seen; shortly after Brown in a somewhat analogous situa-
tion the Court utilized a less demanding (and, it seems, more ambigu-
ous) test.2
5 6
Under a "virtual certainty" or similar test, the other question al-
luded to earlier remains: whether that determination must be based ex-
clusively on the "very nature" of the container, as it is put in footnote 13
of Sanders. If it does, this will undoubtedly be the cause of considerable
difficulty, for it is rather awkward, to say the least, to separate out the
nature of the container from the circumstances of its possession or trans-
portation in making any kind of judgment about what it contains. Rob-
bins provides an excellent illustration of this point. If one were to ask
whether there was a "virtual certainty" that the two packages contained
marijuana, certainly one would consider not only the shape and size and
wrapping of the packages, but also (as Justice Rehnquist emphasized)
that they were found in the luggage compartment after the officers "had
already discovered marijuana in the passenger compartment of the car"
and that the defendant then "stated: 'What you are looking for is in the
back.' ",257 Likewise, in Brown one would consider not only the knotted
balloon but also the fact that it was seen in a car in which several small
plastic vials and quantities of loose white powder were also observed.2 58
In these and similar situations,259 it seems unrealistic to expect that the
''virtual certainty" or similar determination should (or can) be made in
total disregard of the circumstances in which the container is seen.
260
probable cause to believe that contraband was located somewhere in the car-and not merely
in the one balloon at issue." Id. at 1547 (Stevens, J., concurring).
255 Id. at 1547-48 (Stevens, J., concurring). As Justice Stevens observed,
[s]ometimes there can be greater certainty about the identity of a substance within a
container than about the identity of a substance that is actually visible. One might
actually see a white powder without realizing that it is heroin, but be virtually certain a
balloon contains such a substance in the particular context. It seems to me that in evalu-
ating whether a person's privacy interests are infringed, 'virtual certainty' is a more
meaningful indicator than visibility.
Id. at 1548 n.5.
256 See infra text accompanying note 265.
257 Robbins, 453 U.S. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
258 Those additional facts are stressed by the plurality in Brown, though for them the ques-
tion was only one of probable cause.
259 Another situation is when a container of a certain special type is found with other
containers of exactly the same type which are open, revealing their contents. See Blair v.
United States, 665 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1981).
260 The three concurring Justices in Brown did not address this point in specific terms, but
they intimated agreement with it when they stated "a balloon of this kind might be used only
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Of course, if this reasoning is pursued far enough, then the resulting
rule is this: upon a "virtual certainty" that seizable objects are inside a
container, it may be searched without a warrant, regardless of the na-
ture or source of the information upon which that determination is
made. In other words, even where the container itself is innocuous and
unrevealing no warrant is needed if there is an exceptionally strong
showing of probable cause based upon other information.2 6 1 It is doubt-
ful, however, whether footnote 13 of Sanders will or should evolve into
such a rule. For one thing, such an open-ended search warrant excep-
tion, that is, one not limited to the first-hand perceptions of the police
regarding the nature of the container and the circumstances of its use,
would increase significantly the risk of erroneous police decisions on
whether there is sufficient certainty to permit a warrantless search. For
another, such an extension of the Sanders footnote 13 concept would out-
run its rationale, namely, that a person cannot claim any reasonable
expectation of privacy in a container when its "outward appearance" in
the circumstances in which it is used makes it close to certain what it
contains. Certainly, revealing the contents to a confidant, even one who
happens to be especially credible, is another matter.
What then of incriminating admissions by the defendant? Assume
this variation on Robbins: instead of merely saying "What you are look-
ing for is in the back," the defendant says that there is marijuana in the
luggage compartment, but the only container found therein (such as the
tote bag also found in Robbins) itself indicates nothing about its contents.
Is this a case in which a warrantless search is permissible? Justice Rehn-
quist would say yes, for he contended that the defendant in Robbins
"could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the
garbage bags" 262 in light of his admissions to the police. In other words,
the act of stating to police the contents of the container is much like
revealing the contents by using a transparent container;263 in neither
instance, to use the footnote 13 language, does the container "deserve
the full protection of the Fourth Amendment." Authority in support of
this conclusion can be found,264 and it certainly may be argued with
to transport drugs. Viewing it where he did could have given the officer a degree of certainty
that is equivalent to the plain view of the heroin." 103 S. Ct. at 1547; see also supra note 253.
261 An example of this "other information" is an informant with extraordinary credentials,
who fully reveals his solid basis of knowledge.
262 453 U.S. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
263 This analogy is most compelling when the statement is as to the entire contents of the
container. If a person tells the police he has a stolen diamond ring in his suitcase, it might be
argued that this is not a surrender of his privacy expectation regarding the contents of the
suitcase generally.
264 State v. Ludtke, 306 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Minn. 1981) (when passenger in car said satchel
contained hashish and unregistered guns, search without warrant proper, as "here the officer
did not have to infer-he knew-what the contents of the satchel were, More importantly, he
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some force that allowing a warrantless search in such circumstances
makes at least as much sense as allowing it in some of the other situa-
tions already discussed. An unequivocal incriminating admission re-
garding the contents of the container leaves virtually no doubt as to
what those contents are; by contrast, whether the officer's expertise and
experience permit the conclusion that certain types of containers are
very likely used only to hold illegal drugs might be thought to be pre-
cisely the kind of question as to which the judgment of a "neutral and
detached" magistrate would be beneficial.
B. THE CONTROLLED DELIVERY
In another case last Term, llinois v. Andreas,265 the Court for the
first time dealt with the frequent law enforcement tactic commonly re-
ferred to as a controlled delivery. In its purest form, a controlled deliv-
ery involves a situation in which the police first make a lawful
observation of the contraband contents of a certain container and then
keep the receptacle under continual surveillance while it is delivered to
the defendant, at which time the defendant is arrested and the container
seized and opened. In Andreas the Court held that no warrant is needed
in such circumstances because
once a container has been found to a certainty to contain illicit drugs, the
contraband becomes like objects physically within the plain view of the
police, and the claim to privacy is lost. Consequently, the subsequent re-
opening of the container is not a "search" within the intendment of the
Fourth Amendment.
2 6 6
As the dissenters pointed out, this characterization of the reopening
of the package as no fourth amendment search at all is open to serious
question.2 67 But the conclusion that no warrant is necessary in such cir-
cumstances is itself "a sensible rule which reasonably accommodates the
knew that defendant, by volunteering what the contents were, had implicitly signaled that he
no longer had any expectation of privacy in the satchel"). But see People v. Rinaldo, 80 Ill.
App. 3d 433, 435, 399 N.E.2d 1027, 1029 (1980) (a box in defendant's car could not be
searched without a warrant merely because it was certainly the same box which police helped
another person load into his car and which that person said contained a stolen microwave he
was selling to defendant, as the police "had no first-hand knowledge of its contents"). Rinaldo
is distinguishable from Ludtke, for there was no surrender of a privacy expectation by the
defendant himself in Rinaldo; it is more like the informer hypothetical discussed in the preced-
ing paragraph.
265 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983).
266 Id. at 3324.
267 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, stressed that the fourth amendment pro-
tects not only secrecy but also security in effects, that the Court had never before "held that
the physical opening and examination of a container in the possession of an individual was
anything other than a 'search,' " id. at 3325, and that if the reopening was truly no search
then it would not (contrary to the majority's assumption) even require probable cause. Jus-
tice Stevens, in a separate dissent, did not question this branch of the majority opinion.
1220 [Vol. 74
FOUR TH AMENDMENT VA GARIES
values protected by the fourth amendment and the interests of effective
law enforcement. '268 Even if the taking of the container from the arres-
tee is a new seizure, that alone is hardly objectionable. Such disposses-
sion occurs anyway as an incident of the arrest, and, as the Court held in
Sanders, the police have "acted properly-indeed commendably-"-' 269 in
seizing a container that they have probable cause to believe contains
contraband. And even if the opening of the container really is a new
search, the fact that it is made without a warrant is not objectionable
either. This is because the earlier viewing of the contents makes the
probable cause so certain as to be beyond question, thus obviating the
need for a presearch judicial assessment of whether the police are enti-
tled to open the container.
But there was a complicating factor in Andreas: the container, a
large metal box holding a table filled with marijuana, was in defend-
ant's apartment beyond police surveillance for about forty-five minutes.
The Court concluded that this makes no difference, as "there was no
substantial likelihood here that the contents of the shipping container
were changed during the brief period that it was out of sight of the
surveilling officer.
' '270
The Court's analysis is unconvincing. Whether one views the mat-
ter in terms of when a reasonable expectation of privacy reattaches, as
the Court does in Andreas, or in terms of when the warrant process again
becomes meaningful, as would seem more appropriate, certainly a more
demanding test is needed. Justice Stevens proposed the "virtual cer-
tainty" standard he advocated in Brown. That would be a most appro-
priate standard for use in this setting: it is objective, it is more readily
understood by police than (to take Justice Brennan's apt characteriza-
tion) the "vague intermediate standard" 2 71 adopted by the Andreas ma-
jority, and it excepts only a very special case in which added fourth
amendment restraints are clearly unnecessary.
2 72
V. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
In seven of the nine search and seizure cases decided by the
Supreme Court during the October 1982 Term, the Court overturned
lower court rulings which had gone in the defendants' favor. In the
other two-oyer and Place-the Court affirned lower court rulings
268 McConnell v. State, 595 P.2d 147, 154 (Alaska 1979).
269 Sanders, 442 U.S. at 761.
270 103 S. Ct. at 3325.
271 Id. at 3329 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
272 The facts of Andreas stressed by the majority, the "unusual size of the container, its
specialized purpose, and the relatively short break in surveillance," id. at 3325, are such that
the outcome would probably have been the same under a "virtual certainty" test.
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against the state and federal governments, respectively, but in each in-
stance created new fourth amendment law which will be useful to police
and prosecutors in future cases. For some, such a "box score" of the
Court's work in the fourth amendment area last Term undoubtedly suf-
fices to show that something is amiss.
Though it is not simply a matter of won-lost statistics, the thesis of
this Article is that something is amiss-that the Court this past Term
has in several respects been unduly generous in its definition of the pow-
ers which the police may exercise consistent with the protections of the
fourth amendment. This is especially so as to the important questions of
what amounts to a protected expectation of privacy, what constitutes
probable cause, how to strike a balance under Camara-Teny, and when
containers are deserving of the protections of the warrant process. But it
is not only a matter of the result, in the narrow sense, even in the cases
dealing with those issues. Perhaps even more significant is the tenor and
style of the decisions; it is almost as if a majority of the Court was hell-
bent to seize any available opportunity to define more expansively the
constitutional authority of law enforcement officials.
Lest this seem unduly threnodic, consider the following. In Gates
the Court abandoned the well-established two-pronged probable cause
test though (as Justice White made clear) that step was not necessary to
the outcome. In Place the Court held that the use of a sniffing dog is no
search and that luggage may be detained on reasonable suspicion,
though a decision on neither point was necessary to the judgment. In
Royer the plurality endorsed the legality of the initial stop though such a
determination was wholly unnecessary in light of the subsequent police
action amounting to an arrest without probable cause. In Knolls the
Court, in holding that the use of a beeper was not a search, set out
unnecessarily broad dicta on the "open fields" doctrine and the constitu-
tional irrelevance of sense-augmenting devices generally. In Andreas the
Court used a less demanding and more ambiguous standard when a
"virtual certainty" test would have, in all likelihood, produced the same
result. In Lafayette the Court declined to require police to establish more
careful procedures even as to at-the-station inventory, a process which
particularly lends itself to rulemaking at the police level. In Brown the
plurality utilized the "plain view" doctrine in circumstances where it
was not relevant and in the process made it appear indistinguishable
from probable cause. In Long the Court upheld a search of a suspect's
vehicle without probable cause to arrest or search, though the lower
court's decision to the contrary rested upon what theretofore would have
amounted to an independent state ground. In Villamonte-Marquez the
Court countenanced use of roving patrols to board vessels at random
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instead of holding the case moot because of the voluntary dismissal of
the prosecution by the government.
Just how one explains this headlong rush into the conferral of
broader police power is hard to say. Perhaps, as Justice Harlan once
commented in another context, "the Court's actions here can only be
put down to the vagaries of the times. '2 73 But it just may be that this
trend is attributable in part to a perception by the Court that more law
enforcement tools are essential to combat the drug traffic. All nine
search and seizure cases decided by the Court involved drugs, and a
recurring theme is the need for effective enforcement of the drug laws.
Gates makes reference to "the horrors of drug trafficking, 2 74 Place
stresses the " 'compelling interest in detecting those who would traffic in
deadly drugs for personal profit,' "275 the Royer plurality similarly em-
phasizes "the public interest involved in the suppression of illegal trans-
actions in drugs, '2 76 Andreas takes note of "the rigors and contingencies
inescapable in an investigation into illicit drug traffic, ' 277 and Vil-
lamonte-Marquez is grounded largely upon "the need to deter or appre-
hend smugglers" of "controlled substances" and the like.
2 78
It may well be that the complexities and difficulties of the law en-
forcement tasks with which we burden our police are not totally irrele-
vant in fourth amendment adjudication. A static view of the fourth
amendment may be inappropriate both because our forefathers did not
know of the kind of sophisticated surveillance techniques that would
ultimately be available to well-organized police agencies 279 and because
they did not know of "the inability of eighteenth century investigative
procedures to deal with crime, especially organized crime, in an urban-
ized and heterogeneous society. ' 2 0 After all, as the Court said some
years ago in Brn;egar v. United States,2 81 the amendment is intended not
only "to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences
with privacy" but also "to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the
community's protection."
But even conceding this, any diminution of fourth amendment pro-
tections on the supposition that drug enforcement cannot otherwise be
maintained at tolerable levels surely must be undertaken with greater
273 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 215 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
274 103 S. Ct. at 2333.
275 103 S. Ct. at 2642 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980)).
276 103 S. Ct. at 1324.
277 103 S. Ct. at 3324.
278 103 S. Ct. at 2581.
279 See Amsterdam, supra note 20, at 401.
280 Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929, 947
(1965).
281 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
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circumspection and providence than is reflected in last Term's decisions.
(This is especially so in light of the fact that there is reason to believe
that some supposedly "scientific" studies of the fourth amendment's
costs overstate them substantially.282) In the final analysis, all fourth
amendment adjudication should be governed by these acuminous words
from Almeida-Sanchez v. United States:283
It is not enough to argue, as does the Government, that the problem
of [enforcing certain laws] is a serious one. The needs of law enforcement
stand in constant tension with the Constitution's protections of the individ-
ual against certain exercises of official power. It is precisely the predict-
ability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional
safeguards.
Only if this admonition is heeded can it be assured that the maleficent
trafficking in drugs, which has already wrought such tragedy, does not
produce the ultimate injury: atrophy of the fourth amendment and
consequently "the irretrievable impairment of substantial liberties.
'284
282 In his concurring opinion in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2342 n. 13 (1983), Justice
White had this to say about the costs of the fourth amendment:
The effects of the exclusionary rule are often felt before a case reaches trial. A recent
study by the National Institute of Justice of felony arrests in California during the years
1976-1979 "found a major impact of the exclusionary rule on state prosecutions." NA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A STUDY
IN CALIFORNIA 2 (1982). The study found that 4.8% of the more than 4,000 felony cases
declined for prosecution were rejected because of search and seizure problems. The ex-
clusionary rule was found to have a particularly pronounced effect in drug cases; prose-
cutors rejected approximately 30% of all felony drug arrests because of search and seizure
problems.
However, the NIJ study of the experience in California may shed little light upon the
situation nationwide if, as may well be the case, "California police are generally more aggres-
sive in their attempts to detect crime than are other police, and if they work in an environ-
ment characterized by a relatively high frequency of drug offenses." Fyfe, Enforcement
Workshop.- The NIJ Study ofthe Exclusionary Rule, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 253, 255 (1983). In addi-
tion, the statistics in the study appear to be presented in such a way as to make the "costs"
appear much more substantial than they actually are. Illustrative are the statistics on prosecu-
tion screening, which actually support the conclusion that the cases rejected by prosecutors
primarily for search and seizure reasons amount to less than 8/10ths of one per cent of the
total number of felony complaints referred to California prosecutors during the period in
question. It has also been questioned whether some of the statistics-including the 30% figure
in drug cases--are even fairly representative of the situation in California generally. See re-
marks of Professor Yale Kamisar and Judge Shirley M. Hufstedler at Panel Discussion, Crim-
inal Justice Section, ABA Annual Meeting, July 31, 1983, summarized in 33 CRiM. L. R'TR.
2411 (Aug. 17, 1983).
283 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
284 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942).
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